Performance of Active Extension Strategies in the Australian Equities Market by Turner, James
1 
 
 
The University of Sydney 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Performance of Active Extension Strategies in the 
Australian Equities Market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
October 2008 
 
 
James Turner (Student ID: 305156667) 
Supervisor: Dr Reuben Segara 
2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
1. OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................ 6 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ....................................................................... 9 
2.1 Overview of active extension strategies........................................................................9 
2.2 Benefits of active extension strategies ........................................................................11 
2.3 Costs of active extension strategies ............................................................................23 
2.4 Quantitative and fundamental processes....................................................................28 
3. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND................................................................... 31 
3.1 Australian regulation..................................................................................................31 
3.2 International regulation .............................................................................................33 
3.3 Key institutions and investors.....................................................................................34 
4. LITERATURE REVIEW ..................................................................................... 37 
4.1 Early portfolio construction literature .......................................................................37 
4.2 Active management literature.....................................................................................37 
4.3 Empirical analysis of active extension strategies.......................................................39 
4.4 Theoretical models of active extension strategies ......................................................42 
4.5 Other active extension literature ................................................................................43 
4.6 Active extension indexes .............................................................................................46 
4.7 Literature review summary.........................................................................................47 
5. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT....................................................................... 49 
5.1 Skill levels...................................................................................................................49 
5.2 Skew in predictive ability............................................................................................50 
5.3 Risk constraints ..........................................................................................................51 
5.4 Costs ...........................................................................................................................52 
5.5 Volatility .....................................................................................................................53 
5.6 Cross-sectional spread of returns...............................................................................53 
5.7 Market conditions.......................................................................................................54 
6. DATA AND METHOD......................................................................................... 56 
6.1 Data ............................................................................................................................56 
6.2 Stock selection ............................................................................................................57 
6.3 Variance-covariance matrix estimation .....................................................................63 
6.4 Portfolio construction.................................................................................................66 
6.5 Performance measurement .........................................................................................71 
7. RESULTS............................................................................................................... 75 
7.1 Performance overview................................................................................................75 
7.2 Variation in skill levels ...............................................................................................80 
7.3 Risk constraints ..........................................................................................................86 
7.4 Costs ...........................................................................................................................89 
7.5 Volatility, cross-sectional spread and market conditions...........................................92 
7.6 Summary of results .....................................................................................................94 
8. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 96 
REFERENCES .......................................................................................................... 99 
Journal articles and books ...............................................................................................99 
Industry publications ......................................................................................................101 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF ORIGINALITY 
 
I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge 
it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, nor material 
which to a substantial extent has been accepted for the award of any other degree or 
diploma at University of Sydney or at any other educational institution, except where 
due acknowledgement is made in the thesis.  
Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at 
University of Sydney or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis. 
I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, 
except to the extent that assistance from others in the project’s design and conception or 
in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged. 
 
  (Signed) ……………………………………………. 
        James Turner 
 
 
RELEASE OF THESIS 
 
I, James Turner, understand that if I am awarded an honours degree that this thesis 
entitled “Performance of Active Extension Strategies in the Australian Equities Market” 
will be held by the Discipline of Finance and be available after three months for use by 
academic staff or students in research or other academic purpose.  I agree that the Chair 
of Discipline or the Honours Co-ordinator may allow perusal of a copy of the thesis to 
an individual for research or study. 
 
Signed ………………………………………………………..  Date ……………… 
  
     James Turner
4 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to express my thanks to the following individuals: 
 
First and foremost to my supervisor, Dr Reuben Segara. I greatly appreciate the time 
and effort he has spent providing input on this project. He has always endeavoured to 
make himself available at short notice to provide feedback and constructive guidance. 
 
Special thanks must go to Abhishek Das for his input and his in-depth knowledge of the 
subject. 
 
University of Sydney Finance Discipline for providing financial assistance in my 
honours year. 
 
My thanks also goes to Dr Andrew Lepone and the PhD candidates based at the 
Australian Securities Exchange for their advice and support during the second half of 
the year. 
 
Finally, thanks must go to the University of Sydney Finance Honours class of 2008 and 
the teaching staff in the discipline of finance for making this an enjoyable and engaging 
year.
5 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines the performance of active extension strategies, also known 
as ‘130/30’, in the Australian equities market. This strategy involves introducing short 
positions to 30% of the value of a fund while increasing the number of long positions to 
130%, providing 100% net exposure to the market while giving the ability to take a 
larger number of active positions. A detailed analysis of the factors affecting 
performance is explored using a simulation approach based on eight years of historical 
returns for the constituents of the S&P/ASX 200 index and a variety of realistic cost 
assumptions. This study builds on previous analysis by using a simulation approach that 
allows a larger number of contributing factors to be analysed with greater precision. 
There is also a unique advantage to using active extension strategies in the Australian 
market, as a higher level of benchmark concentration relative to other major developed 
market indexes should lead to a higher performance increase from active extension 
strategies over traditional long-only portfolios. This is also one of the first analyses of 
this kind in the Australian market and should have a high degree of relevance to 
institutional investors considering active extension strategies.  
 
This study finds a statistically significant increase in performance from active extension 
strategies over equivalent long-only portfolios, holding all other factors constant. This 
increase is greatest for managers with higher levels of skill, where the manager is 
equally skilled at picking long or short positions. The performance increase from active 
extension portfolios is greatest where any tracking error limit is high and costs are low. 
Volatility and cross-sectional dispersion of returns, two factors hypothesised in the 
literature to affect the relative advantage of active extension strategies, are found to 
have no discernable effect. Similarly, there is no measurable difference in relative 
performance in rising or falling markets. Overall, this study concludes that there is a 
performance gain in relaxing the long-only constraint, provided costs are low, any 
tracking error target is not extremely low, and the manager has a reasonable degree of 
skill in selecting stocks both long and short. 
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1. OVERVIEW 
 
The long-only constraint is one of the most common and most binding portfolio 
constraints imposed on fund managers. Restricting short sales prevents managers from 
fully implementing their complete information set into their portfolio construction. 
Recently, a portfolio structure commonly known as ‘130/30’ or ‘active extension’ has 
become common, as it relaxes the short-selling constraints associated with long-only 
portfolios while retaining an exposure to market returns that market neutral long-short 
portfolios do not have.  In theory, relaxing the short-selling constraint on portfolio 
construction allows for the construction of more efficient portfolios that generate higher 
performance on a risk-adjusted basis. However, increasing short-selling also increases 
costs relating to turnover, stock borrow and financing which act as a drag on portfolio 
performance. Previous research focused on the US equities market has proposed that the 
increased performance of active extension portfolios outweigh the costs, leading to 
higher risk-adjusted performance. This research aims to verify that this proposition 
holds true for the Australian equities market under a number of realistic cost 
assumptions. Additionally, this research quantifies the sensitivity of performance to a 
number of endogenous and exogenous factors such as the level of manager skill, risk 
target, costs and benchmark characteristics. 
 
This area of research has a high degree of relevance to institutional investors seeking 
guidance on the appropriate level of short-selling for a fund by quantifying the benefits 
of introducing short-selling to existing long-only Australian equity portfolios. The rapid 
growth in uptake of active extension strategies has made pertinent an examination of the 
performance of these strategies relative to traditional long-only strategies. Funds under 
management for active extension strategies has grown rapidly, climbing 77% over 
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twelve months to US$53bn as of September 20071, with growth to over US$2 trillion 
forecast by 20102. A large source of growth for active extension strategies is expected to 
come from pension funds, which currently account for ownership of 35% of global 
listed equities. 58% of US Defined Benefit funds are either using or seriously 
considering active extension strategies3. The most common level of short-selling 
associated with these funds is a fixed level of 30% (130/30), although as will be shown 
the most appropriate level of short selling varies depending on the characteristics of the 
relevant portfolio. Performing an examination into the potential performance of these 
strategies in the Australian equities market should assist investors who are considering 
these strategies over traditional long-only funds or market-neutral long-short funds. This 
study also provides an analysis of the magnitude to which active extension portfolios 
outperform long-only portfolios under a variety of market conditions and manager-
specific variables that can assist investors who are considering whether to invest in 
active extension strategies.  
 
As the uptake of active extension funds continues to grow rapidly, it is important to 
have a theoretical and empirical understanding of the performance of this portfolio 
structure. Although similar studies have been conducted by Sorensen, Hua and Qian 
(2007) as well as Armfelt and Somos (2008) on the US market, to date there has been 
no similar analysis performed on the Australian market. This study also builds on 
previous literature by testing both the effectiveness of active extension strategies and 
their sensitivity to various market and portfolio characteristics.  The results of this study 
also build on previous hypotheses and empirical studies conducted predominantly in the 
                                                 
1 Pension and Investments (2007) 
2 Tabb and Johnson (2007) 
3 Pyramis (2006) 
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US equities market, by showing there is a tangible benefit in introducing short-selling 
into long-only portfolios.   
 
Active extension funds also have considerable appeal in the Australian market due to 
higher concentration in the S&P/ASX 200 benchmark, lower regulatory restrictions on 
the amount of leverage that can be employed in retail funds and a highly liquid market 
for borrowing stock. Although active extension portfolios are not yet as common in the 
Australian market as they are in Europe or the US, some Australian superannuation 
funds have followed the lead of pension funds in these markets in providing active 
extension strategies to investors. Given the lack of previous research directed towards 
the Australian market, there is considerable scope for academic research into 
quantifying the benefits of active extension strategies within the Australian equities 
market. Considering the growing uptake in active extension strategies by 
superannuation funds and other institutional investors, an analysis of the performance of 
active extension strategies is also of prime importance to these participants. 
 
The remainder of this study is organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides an introduction 
to the theoretical basis for active extension strategies, as well as the benefits and costs of 
relaxing the short-sale constraint. Chapter 3 outlines the securities regulation that 
applies to active extension funds and gives an overview of existing active extension 
funds in the Australian equities market. Chapter 4 reviews the theoretical and empirical 
studies that have been conducted on the performance of active extension strategies. This 
is followed by Chapter 5 with a description of the hypotheses to be tested. Chapter 6 
describes the data to be tested as well as providing an explanation and justification of 
the model used. Chapter 7 provides results and Chapter 8 presents conclusions. 
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 2.1 Overview of active extension strategies 
 
In recent years, a portfolio structure known as ‘130/30’ or ‘active extension’ has 
become increasingly common. In this type of portfolio, securities to 30% of the value of 
the fund are short-sold, with the sale proceeds reinvested into the long side of the 
portfolio. On a net basis the portfolio has a 100% exposure to the market and often has a 
target beta of one. This portfolio structure presents a hybrid of the market exposure that 
traditional long-only portfolios have with the ability of a long-short fund to take short 
positions. Although the name ‘130/30’ is commonly used to describe this portfolio 
structure, it is often used as a generic term for active extension portfolios with different 
amounts of leverage. As the ‘130/30’ label suggests, a short-selling level of 30% is most 
commonly used for these strategies, although there is nothing to suggest that this 
represents an optimal level of short-selling. In practice, the optimal level can vary 
depending on factors including the level of manager skill, risk target, costs and 
benchmark characteristics. A level of 30% may represent overgearing or undergearing 
depending on these factors, leading to the construction of an inefficient portfolio.  
 
Proponents of this type of strategy argue that it combines the advantages of the 
exposure to market returns of a long-only portfolio with the ability of a long-short 
market-neutral portfolio to take short positions. The structure of an active extension 
portfolio relative to similar equity portfolios is shown in Figure 2.1. Unlike a long-short 
portfolio style traditionally adopted by hedge funds, the fund is fully invested in the 
market at all times and does not seek to generate excess returns by market timing.  
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Figure 2.1: Comparison of active strategies 
 
Instead, the benefit of the strategy comes from removing the long-only constraint and 
introducing the ability to short-sell stocks. Active extension strategies are typically 
benchmarked to an equity index to reflect their full exposure to the market, unlike 
traditional market neutral long-short strategies which are often measured against a total 
return benchmark such as the cash rate. By relaxing the long-only constraint, managers 
are able to fully utilise their views on stocks they expect to underperform as well as 
taking additional positions in stocks they expect to outperform.  
 
Although active extension funds are sometimes viewed as a type of hedge fund strategy 
due to the short-selling employed, in practice they have greater similarities to traditional 
long-only equity portfolios with the addition of greater flexibility and efficiency. Most 
active extension funds have mandates to take positions in equities only and do not 
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invest in the wide range of assets that some hedge funds invest in. Active extension 
strategies have return characteristics that are closer to long-only funds than market-
neutral funds, as they have 100% net exposure to equities at all times and are typically 
benchmarked to a market index. However, similarities exist between the fee structures 
seen in active extension funds and hedge funds. Active extension funds, like hedge 
funds, often charge a performance fee in addition to a base fee that is typically higher 
than that charged by long-only funds. Table 2.1 highlights the key differences between 
active extension strategies, long-only portfolios and long-short hedge funds. 
 
 
Table 2.1: Overview of similar equity active management strategies 
 
 Long-only Active extension 
Market Neutral 
Long-Short 
Investment style Relative return Relative return Absolute return 
Benchmark Market index Market index Cash rate/hurdle rate 
Net exposure 100% 100% 0% 
Gross exposure 100% 160%4 Variable 
Target beta 1 1 0 
Short selling None 30%4 Variable 
FUM US$63.7t5 US$53.3b2 US$2.48t5 
Typical 
management fee 
30-80bp5 60-150bp5 >150bp5 
Performance fee Usually 0% 0-20% Typically 20% 
Introduced in: Mid-1800s Late 1990s 1949 
 
2.2 Benefits of active extension strategies 
 
The prime benefit from relaxing the short-sale constraint comes from the ability to take 
full advantage of negative information about a security. When the constraint on short-
selling is imposed, managers are restricted from efficiently implementing their sell ideas 
into the portfolio.  In the absence of short-selling, the minimum position that can be 
                                                 
4 Assuming typical 130/30 structure 
5 Collins (2007) 
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taken in a security is to have a zero holding. Relative to the index position, the 
maximum underweight position that can be taken in terms of active weighting is the 
negative of the index weight. Relaxing the long-only constraint improves the ability of a 
manager to implement their negative views on a stock by increasing their potential to 
take larger underweight positions to benefit from stocks they expect to underperform. 
Additionally, the extra 30% in long positions allows the manager to gain greater 
exposure to stocks they expect to outperform by taking greater overweight positions.    
 
An additional advantage is based on an argument originally put forward by Miller 
(1977) is that there are inefficiencies that exist on the short side of the market due to the 
prevalence of the long-only constraint. Artificial restrictions placed on long-only funds 
by constraints on short selling have the potential for stocks to become overvalued, 
leading to market inefficiencies. This implies that active extension managers may be 
able to exploit short-side inefficiencies that long-only managers are unable to take 
advantage of. Grinold and Kahn (2000a) propose that it is difficult to show these 
inefficiencies can be exploited by short sellers in reality due to the high implementation 
costs required. In any case, the critical difference with active extension strategies is the 
relaxation of the constraint on active underweight positions that exists in long-only 
funds. 
 
The benefits from relaxing the short-sale constraints are highly related to the level of 
benchmark concentration. Benchmark concentration refers to the large proportion of an 
index made up of a small number of stocks with large market capitalisations. For 
example, the largest 12 stocks in the S&P/ASX 200 index represent 50% of the 
benchmark by capitalisation, with the remaining 189 stocks comprising the remaining 
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50%.6 Only the largest 21 stocks in the index have an index weight above 1%, with the 
bottom 180 having benchmark weights below 1%.7 In a long-only context, it is difficult 
to achieve a meaningful underweight position in these stocks with a restriction on short-
selling in place. Foley (2006) quotes the impact of the uneven distribution of benchmark 
weights as an important motivation for active extension strategies. Where benchmarks 
are more highly concentrated in a small number of large-cap stocks, the tail of smaller 
stocks have lower weightings in the index. As the long-only constraint effectively 
restricts the underweight position on a stock to the negative of its index weight, the 
ability of a manager to implement a meaningful underweight position is restricted. This 
characteristic of concentrated benchmarks reduces the ability of managers to implement 
their negative views evenly across larger and smaller stocks in the benchmark without 
the ability to sell short, restricting a manager’s ability to construct efficient portfolios. 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of index weights in the S&P/ASX 200 ranked from 
largest to smallest along the horizontal axis. By displaying the index weights in this 
manner, it shows that there are a small number of large stocks and a long tail of 
relatively smaller stocks in the index. Similar analysis by Martelli (2005) based on the 
S&P 500 composition in 2003 found that a long-only manager can only underweight 88 
of 500 stocks at a greater level than 0.25%. Table 2.2 shows the six largest and six 
smallest stocks in the S&P/ASX 200 and their respective index weights. The maximum 
underweight position under the long-only constraint gives the most scope for 
underweighting in larger stocks, however for the smaller stocks in the index the 
maximum underweight position without short-selling is an insignificant 0.02%. 
 
                                                 
6 Bloomberg, as of 2 May 2008 
7 There were 201 stocks in the S&P/ASX 200 index as of 2 May 2008. 
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Figure 2.2: S&P/ASX 200 index concentration 
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Figure 2.3: Cumulative benchmark concentration of comparable indexes 
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Table 2.2: Largest and smallest S&P/ASX 200 weightings 
Name 
Index 
Rank 
Index 
Weight8 
Max underweight with 
short-selling constraint 
BHP Billiton 1 12.91% -12.91% 
Commonwealth Bank 2 5.28% -5.28% 
National Australia Bank 3 4.56% -4.56% 
Westpac Banking Corp 4 4.29% -4.29% 
ANZ Banking Group 5 3.88% -3.88% 
Rio Tinto 6 3.46% -3.46% 
    
Octaviar Ltd 196 0.03% -0.03% 
AED Oil Ltd 197 0.02% -0.02% 
APN Property Group 198 0.02% -0.02% 
TSI Fund 199 0.02% -0.02% 
Allco Finance Group 200 0.02% -0.02% 
Perilya Ltd 201 0.02% -0.02% 
 
Table 2.3: S&P/ASX 200 distribution by size 
 >3.0% 1.0-3.0% 0.5-1.0% 0.1-0.5% 0.01-0.1% 
N 7 14 23 90 67 
% of ASX 200 37.5% 24.0% 15.3% 19.3% 3.9% 
 
 
 
Benchmark concentration in the Australian market is more pronounced than that in 
other developed markets due in part to the large weighting of BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, 
Woolworths and the four major banks. Figure 2.3 shows a Lorenz curve, which depicts 
a higher cumulative index weighting of the S&P/ASX 200 index compared to other 
major developed market indexes as of 2 May 2008. Applying the metric of benchmark 
concentration9 used by Grinold and Kahn (2000a) benchmark to the S&P/ASX 200 
gives a value of 0.85, compared to 0.80 for the S&P 500, 0.81 for the FTSE 100 and 
                                                 
8 S&P/ASX 200, as of 2 May 2008 
9 The measure of benchmark concentration used by Grinold and Kahn (2000a) is the Gini coefficient 
applied to cumulative index weights, which is measured as twice the area under the cumulative weight 
curve in Figure 2.3 minus that of an equal-weight benchmark.  
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0.81 for the Eurostoxx 300, suggesting that the Australian market has a higher degree of 
benchmark concentration relative to other major indexes of developed markets.  
Consequently, the ability to underweight most stocks in the Australian market without 
the use of short selling is lower. In the Australian market, this should provide a greater 
benefit to managers in relaxing the long-only constraint in their portfolios. 
 
An argument put forth by some is that active extension portfolios are inherently more 
risky than long-only portfolios because of their higher gross exposure (Patterson, 2006). 
Although increasing the gross exposure of the fund by adding extra short-side and long-
side positions to a portfolio would intuitively appear to increase risk, this is not 
necessarily the case. An active extension portfolio can be constructed with the same 
level of risk as a long-only portfolio using the same set of forecast returns, and as will 
be shown, should on average lead to a higher risk-adjusted return before costs. Since 
increasing the level of short positions also involves adding an equal amount of long 
positions, the systematic risk from the extra short positions are offset. The increased 
residual risk can be mitigated in the construction of the portfolio by proportionally 
reducing the size of other active positions. The ability to utilise short-side information 
in the active extension portfolio should allow for an increased level of performance with 
the same level of risk, as measured by tracking error. 10 
 
An alternative approach to examining the added risk of active extension portfolios is to 
examine the portfolio’s holdings in terms of active weights. Active weights are defined 
as the portfolio weight in a security less the benchmark weight, and provide a measure 
                                                 
10 Tracking error refers to the standard deviation of portfolio returns against the benchmark return.  In this 
context, risk refers to the deviation of the portfolio returns from the benchmark returns. The use of 
tracking error as a measure of portfolio risk is common through industry and in the active management 
literature (see Grinold and Kahn, 2000). 
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of portfolio weighting relative to a benchmark. With the long-only constraint in place, 
the smallest position possible in an individual stock is 0%, and hence the lowest active 
weight possible to have in a single stock is the negative of its benchmark index weight. 
Figure 2.4 gives an example of two stocks with equal active weights but different index 
weights and demonstrates that for a long-only portfolio, negative active weightings are 
easier to achieve for stocks with a large weighting in the benchmark index: 
 
Figure 2.4 – Identical active weights on different sized stocks 
 
The limitation of restricting the size of active underweight positions to the index 
weights acts as a restriction on the ability of a manager to fully implement stocks they 
consider ‘sells’ into their portfolios. The sum of individual stock returns multiplied by 
their active weight in the portfolio gives the portfolio’s active return, or portfolio 
performance less benchmark performance. The marginal contribution of a position in a 
stock to portfolio outperformance can be measured by its active weight multiplied by 
active return, with the sum of these contributions equalling the portfolio’s active return. 
For example, if Stock B in figure 2.4 has a -10% performance and a -3% active weight, 
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the individual contribution of that position to the portfolio’s active return is 0.3%. Thus 
in terms of contribution to active returns, a portfolio weight in stock A of -2.5% (active 
weight of -3%) is equivalent to a portfolio weight of 2% in stock B (active weight of -
3%). As the short-selling constraint restricts managers from taking active positions 
below the negative of the index weight, this severely curtails the size of the underweight 
positions that can be taken in smaller stocks. Thus for the 131 stocks with index weights 
below 0.25%, managers are effectively limited to act on positive information on 
security returns and have a severe restriction on their ability to act on downside 
information.  
 
As tracking error is defined as the deviation of portfolio active returns, the marginal risk 
contribution of an active position is related to its active weight and not whether shorting 
is required to achieve that active weight. In terms of tracking error, the standard 
deviation of portfolio active returns, if it is assumed that both stocks have the same 
return and volatility characteristics and differ only in their index weighting, then both 
positions will have equal risk regardless of the fact that one employs short-selling and 
the other does not. In a long-only setting, the -3% active weight is only achievable in 
stock B due to the short-sale restraint. This long-only constraint acts as an artificial 
restriction on managers on how far they can underweight stocks and prevents them from 
fully implementing their target underweight positions into a portfolio. This limitation on 
active weights is effectively removed in an active extension portfolio. Instead of 
imposing a restriction that all portfolio weights are greater than zero, the constraint 
instead imposes that the sum of short portfolio weights is capped at a fixed level, such 
as 30% in a 130/30 portfolio. 
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Since tracking error risk depends on the size of the active positions and not the size of 
portfolio weights, portfolio risk does not depend on the level of short selling employed. 
This can be shown by using the example of two portfolios created using a portfolio 
optimisation algorithm on the same information set and high tracking error target, one 
of which has the constraint of no short selling. Chapter six provides details on the data 
and method used to perform this optimisation. Figure 2.5 shows the results of the 
portfolio construction at a target tracking error of 6%, with the portfolio weight 
displayed on the y-axis against the individual stocks ranked in order of size on the x-
axis. In the long-only example shown in Figure 2.5, the portfolio weights are 
concentrated into a small number of stocks expected to outperform to best utilise the 
manager’s ‘buy’ ideas within a high risk target. This creates a skew towards the 
utilisation of ‘buy’ ideas against the ‘sell’ ideas, as due to the restriction on short-selling 
the average overweight position is much larger than the average underweight position.  
 
The second portfolio, displayed in Figure 2.6, shows the active weights from the 
portfolio construction for the same set of forecasts and tracking error target with the 
long-only constraint removed. When short selling is introduced, the concentration seen 
in a small number of large long positions in the first portfolio are no longer present, as 
the active weights can be more evenly distributed by the portfolio optimiser over a mix 
of overweight and underweight positions. As a result, the transfer coefficient is higher 
after the long-only constraint is removed. Although the portfolios are constructed with 
the same level of risk, the portfolio with short positions more efficiently allocates the 
active positions across the manager’s buy and sell ideas. This will be shown later to lead 
to a higher risk/reward combination. 
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Figure 2.5: Example long-only concentrated portfolio, TE = 6%, TC = 0.43 
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Figure 2.6: Example 130/30 portfolio, TE = 6%, TC = 0.68 
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An implication of the above is that the benefit of introducing short-selling is positively 
related to the tracking error target. While portfolios with higher target levels of tracking 
error will benefit the most from the introduction of short-selling, this effect is lower for 
stocks with lower risk targets. Generally speaking, funds with lower risk targets will 
take smaller active positions against the index to lower the volatility of their active 
component of returns. If active positions are on average lower, they are less likely to be 
constrained by the requirement to only take long positions. In the case of funds with low 
tracking error limits such as enhanced index funds, which aim to outperform the index 
by a small margin with a low level of volatility relative to the index return, there may be 
little benefit in relaxing the long-only constraint as the active positions taken will likely 
not be meaningful enough to benefit from short-selling. 
 
An additional motivation for the introduction of active extension strategies identified by 
Montagu (2007) is the decrease in dispersion across individual stock returns over the 
past decade. An argument put forward by Clarke, de Silva and Sapra (2008) is that in 
environments of higher correlation between security returns, larger active positions are 
needed to achieve the same level of active performance. In terms of the Grinold and 
Kahn (1989) model, there is less breadth available as the active positions taken will be 
highly correlated with one another. In order to achieve the same target level of 
outperformance, larger active positions need to be taken in periods of high correlation 
between individual security returns. Figure 2.7 shows the average pairwise correlation 
of securities in the S&P/ASX 200, calculated using rolling 12-month periods. Using the 
12-month moving average as a smoothed measure of pairwise correlation, it can be seen 
that the correlation between stocks in the S&P/ASX 200 index has increased over the 
past eight years. 
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Figure 2.7: Average pairwise correlation, S&P/ASX 200 constituents  
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With less correlation in individual stock returns, an active manager can take smaller 
active positions for the same level of tracking error. Due to the smaller active positions, 
they are less likely to be inhibited by the long-only constraint resulting in the benefit of 
an active extension strategy being lower. Conversely, the effect of an increase in 
pairwise correlation on active managers is a lower level of outperformance from their 
stock selection, as the ability to pick outperformers or underperformers is decreased by 
a higher correlation between individual returns and the broader market. Consequently, 
to increase their returns managers need to increase the absolute size of their active 
positions to gain more performance out of their best ideas. As the underweight 
positions are increased, they are more likely to run up against the constraint of no short 
selling, leading to the formation of concentrated long-only portfolios and the under-
utilisation of short-side ideas. In an environment of low dispersion across individual 
stock returns, active extension portfolios should negate the need for highly concentrated 
23 
portfolios by allowing diversification into a larger number of active positions while 
more efficiently utilising the manager’s information set. 
 
Additionally, an increase in overall market volatility has been shown by Clarke, de 
Silva and Sapra (2008) to decrease the benefit from introducing short positions into a 
long-only portfolio. Holding all other factors equal, in periods of higher market 
volatility active weights need to be smaller in order to achieve the same desired level of 
tracking error. Using the Grinold and Kahn (2000a) framework, higher stock volatilities 
will lead to higher expected alphas, which in turn reduce the weightings in the portfolio 
through the optimisation process. If active weightings are lower, the long-only 
constraint becomes less of a restriction and the resulting performance increase in 
relaxing the short-selling constraint is lower. 
 
In short, active extension strategies essentially allow managers to optimise their 
portfolios and equally take advantage of all information available to them. Although 
gross exposure of the fund increases due to extra positions on the long and short side, 
this does not necessarily lead to a higher level of risk. Allowing short-selling permits 
managers to increase the potential size of active underweight positions they can take. 
When looking at performance on a risk-adjusted basis, this allows managers to construct 
more efficient portfolios. 
 
2.3 Costs of active extension strategies 
 
Although the introduction of short-selling can allow a manager to increase returns, it 
also generates a higher level of costs. The first explicit cost comes from the increased 
level of trading within the portfolio. Due to the higher number of positions in the 
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portfolio relative to a long-only portfolio of the same size, more trading is required to 
enter and exit these positions. For example, a typical 130/30 portfolio with a 30% 
shorting level has a gross number of positions to 160% of the value of the fund due to 
the extra 30% of positions on both the long and short side. Assuming the same 
proportion of positions are traded in the 130/30 fund as in a long-only fund, turnover 
will increase by 60%. Considering that many investors use trading stops as a risk 
control to prevent short positions from growing too large if loses are encountered, this 
may further increase the level of turnover. This increased trading volume translates to 
an additional cost through the payment of brokerage commissions and any implicit 
spread or market impact costs incurred. Higher trading costs act as a drag on portfolio 
performance, reducing the net benefit of an increase in short-selling. 
 
The natural drift of portfolio weights away from their target weights, known as passive 
portfolio drift, also incurs a cost as rebalancing back to target weights requires 
additional trading. If the securities held in the long component of the portfolio 
underperform (outperform) the securities held in the short component, the size of the 
short positions relative to the size of the long positions will decrease (increase). For 
example, if the long assets of a 130/30 fund decrease from $130 to $120, while 
simultaneously the short positions decrease in value from -$30 to -$40, the fund has 
passively drifted to a 150/50 allocation. Rebalancing back to a 130/30 allocation 
requires realising these losses by closing out some of the long and short positions. This 
characteristic is, by definition, not shared with long-only portfolios, resulting in a 
hidden cost of rebalancing to maintain target levels of shorting. 
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An additional cost in the practical implementation of an active extension model is the 
cost of funding for the additional long positions. Although standard financial theory 
invokes the concept of a self-financing portfolio that incurs no cost to obtaining 
leverage, this idea is argued by Qian, Hua and Sorensen (2007a) to be unattainable in 
practice. When implementing an active extension portfolio, the short positions cannot 
be fully used to fund the additional long positions due to margin constraints. Proceeds 
from short sales are kept with the prime broker as cash or in cash-like securities, with 
interest paid to the investor less a spread kept by the broker. The incremental amount 
invested in the long side of the portfolio is borrowed from the prime broker, typically at 
a margin above the cash rate. The resulting funding spread between the funds borrowed 
and the cash held as collateral on short sales represents an extra cost to the active 
extension strategy. 
 
In order to short-sell, the stock must first be borrowed. The cost of stock borrow varies 
depending on the availability of stock lent by institutions and the demand from other 
short-sellers. Stocks with a larger capitalisation will typically have a higher availability 
and lower cost of stock borrow. The cost of stock borrow may also vary depending on 
whether there are any corporate actions related to the stock. Stocks involved in takeover 
activity will typically have an increase in stock borrow costs as merger arbitrageurs will 
look to borrow stock to undertake pair trading on the target and the acquirer. In a capital 
raising such as a rights issue, institutions may call back their stock so as to be eligible to 
receive rights, decreasing supply in the market for stock borrow and increasing the costs 
for short-sellers. Although these represent some of the factors that influence the cost and 
availability of stock borrow, this is not an exhaustive list and there are myriad factors 
that may influence borrowing costs. In short, the requirement to borrow stock in order 
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to short-sell introduces an extra cost and complexity that does not exist in long-only 
portfolios.  
 
In addition to the explicit costs of this type of strategy, there are a number of practical 
issues that need to be considered when implementing an active extension strategy. The 
most apparent issue is in the added complexities of taking a short position in a stock 
relative to taking a long position. In order to take short positions, it is necessary for the 
manager to have a relationship with a prime broker who is able to lend shares to the 
fund. This requires paying a fee to the prime broker and introduces the possibility of 
counterparty risk on collateral held with the prime broker if the contract with the prime 
broker is not correctly structured. As outlined above, the availability of stock borrow 
depends on a number of characteristics of the stock. The short seller also has an 
obligation to pay any dividends on the stock and mirror the effect of any corporate 
action such as stock splits or rights issues.   
 
The right of stock-lending institutions to call back their stock at any time creates an 
added risk and potential cost. If lenders start to call their stock back, a resulting decrease 
in the availability of stock to borrow will result in an increased borrow cost. If a 
manager has already shorted the stock at this point, the original owner of the stock may 
exercise their right to call back the lent stock at any time. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
recalls are low for highly liquid stocks, as when an institution wishes to recall stock that 
is on loan prime brokers are able to cover the borrower’s position by simply borrowing 
from another institution. If this is not possible, there may be a ‘short squeeze’, where 
the shorter may be forced to close out their short position by buying in a short period of 
time, possibly incurring market impact costs if it requires a large volume in an illiquid 
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security. If other short-sellers are forced to buy on-market at the same time, the resulting 
trade imbalance may result in higher buying prices.  
 
The addition of short positions also requires a higher attention to risk management. 
Theoretically the potential loss on a short position is infinite as the capacity for share 
price increases is unlimited, whereas for long positions the maximum loss per position 
is capped at 100%. In a well diversified active extension portfolio it is unlikely that a 
single short position could present a significant risk to a large decline in the overall 
portfolio. Like long positions, the size of a short position will increase as the underlying 
stock increases in value, resulting in the size of the position increasing when there is a 
loss. The possibility of stock being recalled at any time and the higher potential for loss 
tends to give short positions a shorter duration than long positions, resulting in higher 
trading costs from the increased turnover required to enter and exit positions (D’Avolio, 
2002). Short sales are also subject to higher regulatory requirements, and in the 
Australian market currently there is uncertainty as to how these regulations may change 
following a temporary ban on short-selling ASX-listed securities.  
 
It is important also to note that the increased performance of active extension portfolios 
over long-only portfolios is contingent on the manager having some skill in identifying 
outperforming and underperforming stocks. As with any active strategy, if the 
underlying stock selection process is not able to select potential outperformers or 
underperformers, it will perform in-line with the broader market on average and will 
possibly underperform after fees and transaction costs.  Although active extension 
strategies allow managers to leverage their active returns to the performance of their 
stock selection model, the opposite is also true. If the stock selection model has negative 
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alpha over a period of time, the active extension structure may increase 
underperformance relative to a long-only portfolio. Therefore it is important to realise 
that active extension strategies are not in themselves a source of high performance, and 
only provide the means for a skilled manager to increase their exposure to their stock 
selection process. In the absence of a skilled manager or a high-performance stock 
selection model, there is no reason to believe that an active extension strategy will 
outperform an equivalent long-only portfolio or its benchmark, and after the increased 
costs necessary to implement short selling the active extension portfolio may 
underperform. 
 
 2.4 Quantitative and fundamental processes 
 
There is also an additional human element in whether managers have equal skill in 
picking potential short positions as they do for long positions. Managers who have 
experience in traditional long-only management using a fundamental stock selection 
process will have developed skills in identifying stocks that are fundamentally 
undervalued; however these skills may not necessarily transfer into selecting stocks that 
are overvalued. Managers who discard from their stock selection process stocks they 
consider unattractive and concentrate their research on a subset of attractive stocks will 
have to expand their research to encompass both attractive and unattractive stocks to 
identify potential candidates for short positions.  In addition to difficulties in stock 
selection, managers who are not familiar with the operational issues associated with 
short selling may not be suited to implementing an active extension strategy. 
 
These problems are less likely to apply to managers using a quantitative stock selection 
process, where the returns for all securities in the investment universe are explicitly 
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forecasted. Quantitative managers typically use factor models to rank all stocks in their 
investment universe in order of attractiveness based on past correlation between factors 
and subsequent returns. In contrast, a fundamental manager may only have the resources 
to analyse a smaller set of stocks. In the case of quantitative management there is no 
disparity between identifying potential short and long positions, as a typical quantitative 
model is able to forecast with a similar degree of accuracy stocks that can underperform 
or outperform. 
 
Quantitative strategies are also highly scalable, in that an existing model can be applied 
to an enlarged investable universe with relative ease. Middleton (2007) identifies that 
there may be a marketing advantage for quantitative managers as they can take existing 
models and back-test their performance in an active extension portfolio to demonstrate 
past performance. Quantitative stock-selection models are often paired with portfolio 
optimisation methods to determine portfolio weights as quantitative stock selection 
models are able to generate forecasts for returns and dispersion for all stocks in the 
investment universe.  Quantitative strategies also often take a detailed approach to 
managing risk, which is an important requirement of active extension strategies given 
that they introduce a number of additional market and operational risks relative to long-
only portfolios.  
 
The advantages of active extension strategies to quantitative managers are reflected in 
the rapid growth of active extension strategies over the past decade with an estimated 
60-80% of funds based on a quantitative process (Johnson et al., 2007). Quantitative 
managers such as State Street and Barclays Global Investors were responsible for most 
of the early implementations of active extension strategies; however the number of 
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active extension strategies offered by fundamental managers is increasing (Middleton, 
2007). Despite the dominance of quantitative funds, the benefits of active extension 
strategies apply to both fundamental and quantitative processes.  This study takes an 
approach to stock selection and portfolio construction that mimics a quantitative 
strategy to reflect the dominance of quantitative management of active extension 
portfolios. However, the implications drawn from the conclusions of this study should 
apply to both quantitative and fundamental-based active extension strategies.  
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3. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
 
This section provides some background into the regulation of active extension funds 
and gives an overview of the major fund providers and investors. An important 
determinant of the growth in active extension strategies has been the regulatory 
environment. Most developed markets have a greater degree of restrictive regulation on 
short selling and the operation of active extension funds relative to long-only portfolios. 
Restrictions are also often placed on the nature of funds that can be marketed to retail 
investors. Other regulation restricts the allocation to alternative or hedge fund strategies 
by pension funds and other institutional investors. Recently, relaxing of existing 
regulation on the use of short selling within funds has provided a catalyst for the growth 
of active extension funds. Regulation on short selling also affects the operation of active 
extension funds and provides an additional complexity relative to long-only portfolios. 
Although there is growing acceptance that it is not appropriate to group active extension 
strategies with alternative strategies such as hedge funds, there are still greater 
regulatory obstacles with marketing and operating active extension funds than with 
long-only funds. 
 
3.1 Australian regulation 
 
An important catalyst for growth in active extension funds in Europe and the US has 
been the easing of regulation restricting the amount of exposure and use of short selling 
in funds marketed to retail investors. In these jurisdictions, different rules apply to how 
long-only funds and hedge funds operate and how they can market funds to investors. 
Due to the short selling and leverage employed in active extension funds, regulation 
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such as UCITS III in Europe and Regulation T in the US provides more onerous 
obligations than apply to long-only funds. In Australia, long-only funds, active 
extension funds and hedge funds can be set up as Managed Investment Schemes (MIS), 
and thus are subject to the same level of regulation. As a consequence, active extension 
funds can be marketed to retail investors with the same set of organisational and 
disclosure requirements as traditional long-only funds. By regulating active extension 
funds and long-only funds under the same system, this provides a less onerous 
regulatory structure for active extension funds than the current system in Europe or the 
US.  
 
Short sales in the Australian equities market are regulated by the Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) and by the government regulator, the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC). Short sales on the ASX can broadly be defined as 
being ‘naked’ or ‘covered’. Naked short sales are regulated by the Corporations Act and 
disclosed to the ASX, which sets strict limits on which securities are allowed to be sold 
short and the maximum allowable level of short sales. In addition, the total number of 
outstanding short sales is disclosed to market participants by the ASX. ‘Covered’ short 
sales, which anecdotally are the predominant method of shorting for institutional 
investors, are executed by borrowing stock through a prime broker or custodian to meet 
settlement obligations.  The common interpretation by market participants is that 
covered short sales do not constitute short sales as defined in the Corporations Act, as 
stock lending arrangements transfer legal ownership of the underlying security to the 
short seller.11 Covered short sales, until recently, have been relatively unregulated and 
were not disclosed to other market participants.12 
                                                 
11 King (2005) 
12 ASX consultation paper (2008) 
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3.2 International regulation 
 
Regulation in the US and Europe provides a more restrictive set of rules for active 
extension funds than for traditional long-only funds. In the US, retail mutual funds must 
comply with ‘Regulation T’ which restricts the amount of leverage that can be 
employed within a fund. Effectively, it limits gross exposure to no more than twice the 
net assets of the fund, resulting in a maximum 150/50 short-selling level on mutual 
funds marketed to retail investors. Running a 150/50 fund within these limits is difficult 
in practice, as passive portfolio drift can cause the relative size of short positions to 
increase beyond the 50% level. Mutual funds and other investment companies regulated 
under the Investment Company Act of 1940 are prevented from relinquishing custody 
of their long positions to a broker, meaning that they are unable to pledge shares as 
collateral and are subsequently subject to higher financing costs and lower potential 
levels of leverage. Hedge funds have lower regulatory constraints and are not subject to 
the same restrictions as mutual funds, however there are restrictions in place on offering 
hedge funds to retail investors. 
 
A similar regulatory structure applied to European funds is UCITS III, instituted in 
2001 as a set of less restrictive regulations on the structure of funds that can be 
marketed to retail investors. Under these regulations the total long position in physical 
securities may not exceed 100%, however the gross position may be increased up to 
200% through the use of derivatives. Pledging securities in respect of margin 
requirements for derivative positions is allowed, providing the security meets certain 
liquidity requirements (Donohoe, 2006).  UCITS III also prevents physical short-selling, 
requiring short derivative positions to underweight securities. Given the gross position 
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limit of 200%, in an active extension strategy the maximum active extension strategy 
allowed is 150/50. Although this analysis does not consider the use of derivatives, the 
results should also apply to funds that use derivatives to gain exposure given that 
derivative exposure can essentially be replicated in the underlying cash equities market.  
 
3.3 Key institutions and investors 
  
Active extension strategies are predominantly provided by institutions that have 
backgrounds in quantitative strategies and have experience providing other long-short 
products to investors. Table 3.1 gives a summary of the largest active extension 
providers by funds under management. Most of the largest providers use a quantitative 
approach, mirroring the findings by Johnson et. al (2007) that 60-80% of active 
extension strategies are driven by quantitative processes. Most of the larger funds also 
have experience providing existing strategies that use short selling. 
 
Table 3.1: Largest active extension managers, globally 
 Total active extension (US$m)(1)
Quantitative or 
fundamental process 
Offers other long-
short strategies 
State Street 11,726 Quantitative Yes 
Barclays Global 
Investors 5,000 Quantitative Yes 
Jacobs Levy 4,891 Quantitative Yes 
Goldman Sachs AM 4,000 Quantitative Yes 
Analytic Investors 3,487 Quantitative Yes 
Aronson Partners 3,311 Quantitative Yes 
JPMorgan AM 3,291 Fundamental Yes 
Acadian AM 2,509 Quantitative Yes 
(1) Source (FUM): Pensions and Investments, as of 30 September 2007 
 
The largest uptake in active extension strategies globally has been from pension funds. 
As of August 2007, pension funds owned 35% of global equities (Watson Wyatt, 2007) 
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and were responsible for most of the $50bn invested in active extension strategies 
(Middleton, 2007). In effect, the aim of pension funds is to meet pension liabilities with 
the lowest level of contributions necessary, which is achieved by maximising returns in 
the intervening years. Active extension strategies offer pension funds the same exposure 
to market returns as long-only funds, but with added scope for outperformance over 
market returns. In the notation of Jensen (1968), they combine the beta exposure of 
long-only funds with the ability of a hedge fund to generate additional alpha, assuming 
the manager has the ability to outperform. This represents an appealing combination to 
pension funds that rely on market returns to meet their long-term liabilities but also seek 
a ‘kicker’ in the form of outperformance against the market to enhance returns. It is for 
this reason that pension funds have been utilising active extension strategies as a 
replacement for ‘core’ long-only equity strategies in their portfolios, with 58% of US 
defined benefit plans as of April 2007 either using or seriously considering active 
extension strategies (Pyramis, 2007). The high take-up of active extension plans by 
pension funds in the US and Europe has been mirrored by some of the larger 
superannuation funds in Australia, with HESTA, Hostplus, Care Super, JUST Super and 
SPEC Super allocating some of their portfolios to active extension strategies. 
 
An alternative active strategy to pension funds other than active extension strategies are 
market-neutral hedge funds. Currently, hedge funds comprise at most only 5-10% of 
asset allocation for pension funds (Stewart, 2007). Although market-neutral hedge funds 
can provide a source of returns with low correlation to the broader market, their lack of 
exposure to market returns makes them unsuitable for meeting long-term pension 
liabilities. To provide long-term returns, market exposure provides the means by which 
pension funds can achieve long-term growth. One of the reasons active extension funds 
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are being adopted by the pension fund industry is that they provide an effective 
crossover between long-only funds and market-neutral hedge funds, by providing beta 
exposure while lifting restrictions on the managers’ ability to pursue outperformance. 
This exposure to market returns allows pension funds to invest a larger proportion in an 
active extension fund or fund of funds than they currently assign to hedge funds in order 
to maximise exposure to both market returns and outperformance. 
  
The take-up of active extension funds has so far been predominantly led by institutional 
investors such as pension funds, with few retail active extension funds on offer. One 
possible explanation may be the dominance of quantitative active extension strategies, 
with 60-80% of active extension portfolios estimated to be run using a quantitative 
approach (Johnson et al., 2007). An argument put forward by Iyer (2006) is that retail 
investors may not be attracted to quantitative strategies as the process of selecting 
investments by a statistical model may seem counterintuitive, or inferior to a 
fundamental process that involves detailed research and company visits. An additional 
consideration may be that regulation in the US and Europe has previously been highly 
restrictive on the use of shorting in retail funds, resulting in the offerings of active 
extension funds to retail investors lagging that of institutional investors. It is also 
possible that some retail investors may also view the use of short selling as being highly 
speculative or detrimental to the market. 
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4. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
4.1 Early portfolio construction literature 
 
 
The origins of modern portfolio theory lie with the seminal work by Markowitz (1959) 
who formulates a clear mathematical approach to creating portfolios that optimise risk-
adjusted returns to investors. Markowitz’s work divides the process of portfolio 
construction into two distinct steps of forming a set of beliefs about future security 
performance and implementing these beliefs through the construction of an efficient 
portfolio. An additional proposition was that diversification was crucial to minimising 
variance for utility-maximising investors. Sharpe (1963) expanded on this work by 
postulating that assets are priced based on their beta, a measure of sensitivity to 
movements in the overall market. These seminal works showed that portfolio 
construction is in effect an optimisation problem and highlighted the importance of 
diversification in achieving an optimal risk-return tradeoff. The insights of Markowitz 
and Sharpe, among many others, provide the groundwork for modern portfolio theory. 
 
4.2 Active management literature 
 
In the past two decades, a subset of portfolio theory has been created based on active 
management of portfolios. The main concept behind active management literature is 
that active managers have the goal of outperforming market returns with the lowest 
amount of deviation relative to the benchmark, rather than aiming to form a portfolio 
that overall has a high reward/risk tradeoff. Much of the work in the area of modern 
active management theory can be traced back to Grinold (1989), who introduces the 
‘fundamental law of active management’ equation as: 
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IR = IC.√N          (4.1)  
 
where IR is the observed information ratio, a measure of risk-adjusted outperformance, 
IC is the information coefficient given by the correlation of forecast security returns 
with realised security returns, and N is the number of securities in the investment 
universe. Although Grinold acknowledges that the fundamental law is approximate in 
nature, the important intuition is that returns are a function of information level, breadth 
of investment universe and portfolio risk.  
 
Clarke, de Silva and Thorley (2002) extend the seminal ideas of Grinold (1989) by 
introducing the idea of a transfer coefficient to measure the efficiency of portfolio 
implementation. The transfer coefficient measures how efficiently forecast returns are 
implemented into portfolio construction. A simplifying assumption of the Grinold 
(1989) framework is that managers have no restrictions in how they can construct a 
portfolio from the information set they possess. Grinold himself states that the 
fundamental law “gives us only an upper bound on the value we can add” because of the 
assumption we can “pursue our information without any limitations”. Clarke, de Silva 
and Thorley (2002) modify the fundamental law to incorporate a ‘transfer coefficient’ 
which measures the efficiency of portfolio implementation. In terms of the Grinold 
(1989) framework, portfolio performance as measured by the information ratio is 
roughly equal to the information coefficient times the transfer coefficient: 
 
IR = TC.IC.√N        (4.2) 
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In effect, the transfer coefficient acts as a scaling factor on the level of information. This 
is an important result, as it infers that portfolio outperformance is driven not only by the 
ability to forecast security returns but also by the ability to frame those security returns 
in the form of an efficient portfolio. The implication is that managers who are skilled at 
forecasting security returns need to be able to construct an efficient portfolio to 
maximise the benefit from their information. Assuming the construction of an efficient 
portfolio in the absence of any constraints, the transfer coefficient will be equal to one. 
Constraints on portfolios lower the transfer coefficient as they place limits on how 
efficiently managers can construct portfolios that reflect their forecasts.  
 
4.3 Empirical analysis of active extension strategies 
 
Clarke, de Silva and Thorley (2002) also extend their analysis with a Monte Carlo 
simulation of example portfolios constructed from the constituents of the S&P 500, 
subject to a set of constraints. The effect of size-neutrality, sector neutrality, value-
growth neutrality, maximum total number of positions and long-only constraints are 
analysed by the authors. They find that the long-only constraint is the most significant 
restriction placed on portfolio managers, but point out that by nature of its ubiquity is 
often ignored as a constant that affects portfolio construction. Subsequent literature uses 
the framework developed by Clarke, de Silva and Thorley (2002) to examine the effects 
of the long-only constraint on the transfer coefficient. 
 
The effect of constraints on portfolio efficiency, measured by the transfer coefficient, is 
further studied in a later paper by Clarke, de Silva and Sapra (2004). The authors look at 
a broad range of constraints, including market capitalisation, industry, sector, active 
weight and short sale restrictions. Two series of optimisations are run to show the 
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impact of the long-only constraint on portfolio efficiency, with optimisation constraints 
of a beta-one portfolio subject to a tracking error limit. The marginal performance 
increase of increasing short-sales is found to be diminishing, with the performance 
increase from moving from long-only to 110/10 greater than that from moving from 
110/10 to 120/20. The authors find that as tracking error increases the effect of the long-
only constraint is intensified, resulting in a lower transfer coefficient as tracking error is 
increased. A trade-off exists between the maximum possible transfer coefficient, the 
level desired level of tracking error and level of shorting. As tracking error increases, 
the transfer coefficient will decrease unless the level of shorting is also increased. The 
inference from this is that the optimal level of shorting is positively related to the 
targeted level of tracking error. The authors conclude that the short sale constraints in a 
long-only portfolio cause the most significant reduction in portfolio efficiency.  
 
An analysis by Foley (2006) shows the differences in implementation of active 
extension strategies over various US equity indexes. The common factors put forward 
by Foley as affecting the attractiveness of active extension strategies are the impact of 
benchmark weight distribution, level of manager skill and tracking error target. Similar 
to the analysis by Clarke et al. (2002, 2004), Foley’s analysis uses a simulation 
approach, with measures in the changes of the transfer coefficient as a means of 
analysing the benefits of active extension strategies at different levels of shorting. The 
simulated portfolios are constructed using a mean-variance framework with the desired 
level of tracking error found as a function of the level of investor risk aversion. Foley 
finds that portfolios benchmarked to small and mid-cap indexes exhibit the greatest 
benefit from introducing active extension strategies, even after adjusting for the higher 
cost and difficulty in shorting these stocks.  
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Sorensen, Hua and Qian (2007) examine the added costs and benefits associated with an 
active extension structure relative to a long-only structure. The authors view the long-
only constraint as being highly restrictive on the ability of managers to outperform their 
benchmarks. Similar to Clarke, de Silva and Sapra (2004), they analyse the effects of 
tracking error constraints through a series of simulations. Simulated manager forecasts 
are backed out of realised returns, assuming a level of skill given by the information 
coefficient. Portfolios are then constructed using an optimisation method subject to a 
constraint on the total level of short selling and tracking error target. The authors also 
incorporate the effect of higher transactions costs, finding after costs that the benefits 
from active extension portfolios are still positive. The optimal degree of shorting was 
shown empirically to be a function of manager skill, desired risk target, turnover, 
leverage and trading costs. The important implication of this analysis is that there is no 
universal optimal level of short selling in an active extension portfolio. Instead, an 
appropriate level of short selling will depend on a combination of factors endogenous to 
each fund, such as manager skill and tracking error targets, and factors common to the 
market such as trading costs, stock borrow costs, volatility, benchmark concentration 
and market breadth. 
 
Johnson, Kahn and Petrich (2007) construct a similar model for historical back-testing 
of 130/30 portfolios, using stock returns over the period from 1994-2006 for their 
model. The stock selection model chosen mimics those used by quantitative investors, 
using a factor ranking methodology based on factors of analyst estimate revisions, long-
term price momentum and common valuation multiples. The portfolio is rebalanced 
monthly based on changes in rankings. The authors find that the simulated 130/30 
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portfolio returns an average annual Cumulative Average Gross Return (CAGR) of 
11.0% compared to the long-only portfolio, which returns 7.6%. On a risk-adjusted 
basis, the returns as measured by the information ratio were higher for the 130/30 
portfolio than the long-only portfolio. 
 
Armfelt and Somos (2008) conduct a similar study using historical equity returns to 
analyse the hypothetical performance of active extension portfolios at various levels of 
leverage relative to a long-only portfolio. Twenty-five Fama-French portfolios formed 
on size and book-to-market ratios are used in the analysis over a long historical period 
of 1927-2007. The authors find that in the range from 100/0 to 150/50, the 150/50 
portfolio with the highest gross exposure had the highest performance over the 80-year 
period after adjusting for transaction costs. The average CAGR of 130/30 strategies for 
the 80-year period is 16.4%, outperforming the long-only average CAGR of 14.6% and 
benchmark index CAGR of 10.2% by a statistically significant amount.  
 
4.4 Theoretical models of active extension strategies 
 
Johnson, Kahn and Petrich (2007) construct a theoretical framework for determining the 
optimal level of short selling within an active extension portfolio. Their analysis shows 
that using a short selling level that is too excessive or too conservative can have a major 
effect on the efficiency of a portfolio. Furthermore, the authors find that exceeding the 
optimal level of short selling causes a sharp drop off in risk-adjusted returns, implying 
that the costs of excessive shorting are greater than shorting levels that are too 
conservative. The framework is reinforced by an empirical analysis using a simulation 
approach by generating optimal active extension portfolios at variable levels of gearing. 
Although the authors attempt to quantify the optimal level of shorting, they 
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acknowledge that finding optimality ex-ante in a real world context is a difficult 
exercise due to the many factors that can change over time. 
 
In a 2008 paper, Clarke, de Silva and Sapra extend on their previous simulation-based 
analysis by providing a mathematical model of active extension portfolios. The model 
developed by the authors shows that the expected short weight for a security depends on 
the size of the security’s benchmark weight and its expected active return. An 
expression for the expected benchmark weight for each security is derived based on a 
set level of benchmark concentration. Given the expected benchmark weight and 
expected active weight, an expression is derived for the expected short position per 
security. The sum of the expected short weights gives the expected level of short 
positions for the portfolio. By introducing costs, an optimal level of portfolio shorting is 
determined by using an approach where the marginal benefits of shorting equal the 
marginal costs. Using historical data, the authors apply the analytical model and find 
that, similar to previous empirical studies, the effective level of shorting is highly 
related to the accuracy of the return forecasting, target risk level, benchmark 
concentration and marginal costs of shorting. The authors also show that an increase in 
benchmark concentration and pairwise correlation between stocks increases the 
expected level of short selling, while an increase in market volatility decreases the 
desirable level of shorting. 
 
4.5 Other active extension literature 
 
Jacobs, Levy and Starer (1998) explore commonly held myths surrounding long-short 
portfolios and analyse whether long-short portfolios, both market neutral and with net 
market exposure, are optimal allocation choices for investors. They find that long-short 
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portfolios which have no net market exposure are generally suboptimal choices for 
utility maximising investors. On the other hand, they argue that there is merit in long-
short portfolios with some exposure to market returns (referred to as ‘equitised long-
short portfolios), given the individual has a high enough risk tolerance and the manager 
has some form of skill in their stock selection. Although this research predates popular 
introduction of active extension strategies, which are in effect equitised long-short 
portfolios with a constraint on having close to 100% net exposure at all times, the 
authors findings are generally in line with that of later analysis on active extension 
strategies. Jacobs, Levy and Starer (1999) extend on these findings in a later paper 
which examines the characterisation of long short portfolios. The authors propose that 
constructing long-short portfolios that have no exposure to systematic risk is not 
necessarily optimal. Long-short portfolios with market exposure are also argued to be 
more similar to traditional long-only portfolios than market-neutral long-short funds. 
 
Following Jacobs, Levy and Starer (1998, 1999) who analyse long-short portfolios with 
market exposure in comparison to market neutral long-short portfolios, Jacobs and Levy 
(2006) analyse their efficiency in relation to long-only portfolios. The authors show 
that, assuming long positions can be used as collateral on short positions, proceeds from 
short positions can be used to fund additional long positions, thus negating the issue of 
funding costs. Anecdotal evidence suggests this is common practice by prime brokers in 
the Australian market. The level of performance increase from active extension 
strategies is shown to be a function of what the limits on risk are, as measured by 
tracking error. The authors also argue, as in Jacobs and Levy (1996) that artificial 
constraints on tracking error lead to suboptimal results for investors. However in 
practice constraints on tracking error are commonly used as a means of risk control. 
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Jacobs and Levy (2007a) extend their previous analysis to a comparison of active 
extension portfolios to equitised long-short portfolios, which are a combination of 
market-neutral long-short portfolios with market exposure through an index Exchange 
Traded Fund (ETF), index swaps or futures contracts. The popularity of this investment 
style comes from a recent industry trend towards ‘portable alpha’, where a portfolio is 
divided into a low-cost source of index exposure such as an ETF to provide ‘beta’ and a 
market-neutral active strategy to provide the ‘alpha’ component. Notionally, an 
equitised long-short portfolio shares many characteristics with active extension 
portfolios, having a similar degree of market exposure while retaining the ability for 
managers to take long and short active positions in stocks. The authors argue that an 
active extension fund provides a superior alternative to the combination of market 
neutral funds with added index exposure due to lower costs of implementation, as a 
combination portfolio would lead to added costs from some stocks being simultaneously 
held long and short. Given this advantage of active extension portfolios and the 
interchangeable nature of the two strategies, Jacobs and Levy (2007a) propose that 
active extension strategies are the optimal alternative of the two. 
 
Gastineau (2008) provides an alternate method of portfolio construction suitable for 
fundamental managers who do not have skill in identifying candidates for short 
positions. Gastineau proposes that managers can short-sell sector ETFs or buy special 
‘short ETFs’ as a method of taking a short position while minimising exposure to 
idiosyncratic risk. ETFs are also advantageous in that they are easy to borrow with no 
material risk of a short squeeze as market makers are usually able to easily create new 
units in an ETF for lending at a low cost. If an institutional investor does not have the 
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analytical ability to identify individual short positions, the ability to handle risk 
management or strong enough relationships with prime brokers to implement short 
positions, Gastineau suggests the use of ETFs as an intermediate step towards a full 
active extension implementation. In this way a manager who is lacking in the skills or 
the operational processes to move from a long-only to an active extension strategy can 
still capture some of its benefits.  
 
4.6 Active extension indexes 
 
Lo and Patel (2008) propose the use of an index specially designed for active extension 
portfolios. The composition of the index mimics the approach taken by institutional 
quantitative investors by constructing portfolios based on ten commonly used 
quantitative factors combined with a portfolio optimisation method.  The authors argue 
that a passive benchmark need not be necessarily weighted by size, and draw upon 
recent work by Arnott, Hsu and Moore (2005) in formulating a ‘fundamental index’ 
where weights are determined by historical fundamental factors. Similarly, the 130/30 
index proposed by Lo and Patel uses a predetermined set of rules on forecasting 
individual stock returns based on quantitative factors, with the exact weights determined 
by a portfolio construction using the proprietary BARRA system. The idea of a special 
130/30 index has been adopted by both S&P and Credit Suisse. S&P has created an 
index called ‘S&P 500 130/30 Strategy Index’, composed of weightings equal to the 
S&P 500 index weightings, plus an extra 1% for attractive stocks or less 1% for 
unattractive stocks as chosen by a proprietary quantitative model named STARS.13 
                                                 
13 S&P 500 130/30 Strategy Index Methodology. Retrieved 10 July 2008, from 
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/SP_500_130-
30_Strategy_Index_Methodology_Web.pdf  
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Credit Suisse has also announced the introduction of a 130/30 index based on the 
construction method outlined in the paper by Lo and Patel (2008).14 
 
Despite recent innovations in creating new benchmarks for active extension portfolios, 
traditional market capitalisation weighted indexes will be used for the purposes of 
benchmarking in this thesis. A market capitalisation-weighted index provides an 
average of all equity portfolios in an investment universe weighted for portfolio size, 
such that the sum of all weighted portfolio outperformance and underperformance is 
mathematically equal to zero. It also provides a passive alternative, as the naïve 
alternative to an active strategy would be to buy the index. The construction techniques 
of these new indexes depend on an arbitrary choice of quantitative factors, and are not 
commonly accepted as benchmarks. In addition, it is difficult to justify how the indexes 
can proxy market risk better than established market capitalisation weighted indexes 
can.  
 
4.7 Literature review summary 
 
Table 4.1: Summary of previous research into active extension strategies 
 
Grinold (1989) 
Formulated the fundamental law of active management, which 
expresses risk-adjusted performance as a function on manager skill 
and size of investment universe (breadth). 
Jacobs, Levy and 
Starer (1998) 
Found market-neutral long-short portfolios to be an inferior for utility-
maximising investors to equitised long-short portfolios.  
Jacobs, Levy and 
Starer (1999) 
Equitised long-short portfolios (equivalent to active extension 
portfolios) have a greater deal of similarity to long-only portfolios 
than market-neutral long-short funds. 
Clarke, de Silva and 
Thorley (2002) 
Extend the fundamental law of active management of Grinold (1989) 
by introducing the transfer coefficient, a measure of portfolio 
efficiency. Constraints are tested through a Monte Carlo simulation. 
The long-only constraint is found to be the most significant. 
                                                 
14 Credit Suisse and AlphaSimplex launch the industry’s first 130/30 index. Retrieved 10 July 2008 from 
http://www.credit-suisse.com/news/en/media_release.jsp?ns=40513 
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Clarke, de Silva and 
Sapra (2004) 
Examines the relationship between the transfer coefficient, maximum 
permitted level of short selling and tracking error. The effect of the 
long-only constraint is intensified when tracking error limits are 
increased. The greatest marginal increase in efficiency comes from 
moving from long-only to 110/10. 
Foley (2006) 
Analyses the effect of benchmark concentration by comparing the 
performance of active extension portfolios over different US equity 
indexes. The greatest benefit is found to be in small- and mid-cap 
stocks.  
Jacobs and Levy 
(2007a) 
Active extension portfolios are notionally equivalent to equitised long-
short portfolios, but are more efficient as the unnecessary cost of 
holding some stocks simultaneously long and short is removed. 
Jacobs and Levy 
(2007b) 
Provides a theoretical rational for active extension strategies and 
refutes a number of perceived myths.  
Johnson, Kahn and 
Petrich (2007) 
Backtests an active extension and a long-only portfolio based on a 
quantitative factor model. The 130/30 portfolio gives a CAGR of 11% 
relative to a 7.6% return for the long-only portfolio. 
Sorensen, Hua and 
Qian (2007) 
Uses a simulation approach to analyse the performance of active 
extension strategies. After transactions costs, the performance of 
active extension strategies is higher than that of long-only funds. The 
optimal level of short selling to use is a function of portfolio-specific 
factors and exogenous market factors. 
Armfelt and Somos 
(2008) 
Studies the historical performance of active extension strategies over 
the period 1926-2007 in the US market. Portfolios are constructed 
based on the Fama and French (1993) model. The 150/50 strategy is 
found to have the highest risk-adjusted performance. 
Clarke, de Silva and 
Sapra (2008) 
Derives a theoretical model of active extension portfolios. The optimal 
short weight of a security depends on benchmark concentration, 
tracking error, stock selection skills and transaction costs. 
Gastineau (2008) 
Proposes the use of ETFs in implementing active extension strategies 
for managers with little previous experience in short selling in order to 
gain some of the benefits of active extension strategies.  
Lo and Patel (2008) 
Constructs a benchmark index for active extension portfolios. The 
index is based on a ten factor quantitative model, with the weights 
determined by a portfolio optimisation process. 
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5. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Previous research has made a convincing case for the advantages of active extension 
portfolios. The performance of active extension strategies is determined by various 
factors relating to both the manager and overall market conditions. The predictive skill 
of a manager and their target level of tracking error affect how an active extension 
portfolio would perform relative to an equivalent long-only portfolio and the market 
index. Market characteristics, such as volatility, correlation between returns and 
whether market returns are positive or negative can also affect the performance of active 
extension strategies. Specific hypotheses as to the effects of these factors are outlined 
below, in relation to the effect they have on the performance of active extension 
strategies. 
 
5.1 Skill levels 
 
Theoretically, managers with higher skill levels are able to benefit more from relaxing 
the long-only constraint (Qian, Hua and Sorensen, 2007). Increasing the short selling 
level only has a net benefit if the increase in outperformance is greater than the 
increased cost burden; therefore for a higher skill level the manager will be able to push 
short selling levels to a higher level until the additional costs outweigh the marginal 
benefits. As Foley (2006) points out, in the case where a manager has no stock picking 
skill (IC ≈ 0) the optimum level of short selling will be zero, since increasing short 
selling levels will only result in higher costs. In the case where a manager has some 
predictive skill (IC > 0), the manager will be able to transform larger active weights into 
greater outperformance, leading to a higher level of performance from active extension 
strategies as they utilise the manager’s informational advantage.   
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H1: Managers with higher skill levels have a greater increase in performance from 
relaxing the long-only constraint. 
 
5.2 Skew in predictive ability 
 
One of the barriers to successful implementation of active extension strategies identified 
by Gastineau (2008) is the ability of the manager to be able to pick stocks that can 
potentially underperform in addition to picking stocks that can outperform. Managers 
who have previous stock-selection experience in managing long-only portfolios are 
likely to have developed greater skills in identifying potential outperformers than 
potential underperformers. Intuitively, being able to pick potential underperformers is a 
key concern when managing a portfolio that involves short selling. This leads to the 
second hypothesis: 
 
H2: Managers with a higher skew towards picking underperforming stocks can 
construct active extension portfolios with higher levels of performance. 
 
The benefit of introducing short selling depends on the relationship between the 
marginal benefit of an increase in short positions against the increased costs. If the 
manager has a greater skill at picking underperformers, intuitively they will have greater 
performance from their short positions and thus a higher optimal level of short sales. In 
the extreme case of a manager with skill only in identifying outperformers and no skill 
identifying potential underperformers, there will be limited benefit from an increase in 
short sales and therefore the performance increase from relaxing the short-selling 
constraint will be lower. There will still however be some advantage in an active 
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extension strategy by using short positions to finance additional overweight positions. 
An example of this is given by Gastineau (2008), who identifies that an active extension 
strategy can use short positions in index-tracking sector ETFs to provide greater risk-
return outcomes than long-only strategies. 
 
The outcome of this hypothesis has implications for differences between fundamental 
and quantitative managers. Fundamental managers may have more skill at picking 
potential outperformers rather than underperformers by virtue of the fact that experience 
in stock selection in a long-only context would have required the selection of 
undervalued rather than overvalued stocks. Quantitative managers who use scalabale 
mathematical or statistical models to forecast future stock-level performance are usually 
able to generate forecasts for all securities in an investment index with an equal skew in 
forecasting ability towards underperformers and outperformers. If these assumptions 
hold true, there is likely a greater performance increase to be had from active extension 
strategies to quantitative managers than to fundamental managers. 
 
5.3 Risk constraints 
 
H3: Portfolios with higher tracking error limits have a greater performance increase 
from relaxing the long-only constraint. 
 
The size of tracking error is a function of portfolio active weights and the variance-
covariance matrix. In general, the tracking error of a portfolio will be proportional to the 
gross size of active weights. Portfolio managers usually have some form of risk 
constraint placed on them by investors or fund administrators in the form of a limit to 
tracking error. As Jacobs and Levy (2006) identify, a portfolio with a low tracking error 
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target such as an enhanced index fund will likely have weights close to the index and is 
not restricted by the long-only constraint. Funds with higher tracking error targets will 
have higher active weight positions as managers are able to take larger sized overweight 
and underweight positions within the risk target. As the active weight sizes are 
increased, managers are more likely to run up against the short-sale constraint when 
implementing their underweight positions. In a long-only portfolio, managers will tend 
to concentrate the portfolio by holding large positions in their favourite stocks, but they 
are restricted from doing the opposite and going underweight in their least favourite 
stocks because of the long-only constraint. Funds with higher tracking error targets are 
more likely to be constrained by a long-only requirement and will gain the greatest 
increase in transfer coefficient from relaxing the long-only constraint. As Clarke et al. 
(2004) points out, there is a trade-off between the maximum transfer coefficient, target 
tracking error and level of shorting. If the portfolio has a higher tracking error target, a 
higher level of shorting is needed to maximise the transfer coefficient. 
 
5.4 Costs 
 
Transaction, financing and stock borrow costs increase proportionally to the gross 
exposure of the fund, which is driven by the level of short selling in the portfolio. A 
higher cost base will begin to act as a drag on portfolio performance net of costs, 
decreasing the benefits of an active extension strategy.  Higher costs should decrease the 
attractiveness of higher levels of gross exposure, leading to a lower optimum shorting 
level. Whether the decrease in optimal level of shorting is material depends on the level 
of costs against the skill the manager possesses. 
 
H4: An increase in costs will lower the performance of active extension strategies. 
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5.5 Volatility 
 
One of the consequences of a high risk target in a long-only context is that managers 
create portfolios with weightings concentrated in their best overweight selections. An 
argument put forward by Montagu (2007) is that in higher volatility scenarios, higher 
concentration may expose a portfolio to the potential for higher risk due to their lower 
diversification. Alternatively, an active extension strategy gives the potential for 
targeting a lower level of risk for the same amount of return by utilising short-side 
information in a portfolio with added diversification, achieving a higher risk-return 
outcome. In a higher volatility environment the benefits of increased diversification 
should increase the net benefit of increasing short-selling, leading to higher risk-
adjusted returns for active extension portfolios. 
 
H5: Higher market volatility will increase the performance of active extension 
strategies. 
 
5.6 Cross-sectional spread of returns 
 
An analysis of cross-sectional dispersion of returns by Montagu (2007) found a sharp 
increase in pairwise correlations between S&P/ASX 200 stocks in the decade to 2007, 
suggesting that correlation between stock returns is increasing. If a manager takes active 
positions against the index that are expected to outperform, a high correlation between 
their active positions and the overall market will reduce their outperformance of the 
index. The implication of this for active managers is that there are lower opportunities 
in the market to generate outperformance. Taking an active position in a security will 
lead to less excess return when correlations are higher as the excess returns from that 
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position will be more highly correlated with the rest of the portfolio. Accordingly, to 
reach the same level of performance managers will have to increase their active weight 
sizes and in doing so are more likely to run up against the long-only constraint. This 
leads to the following hypothesis:   
 
H6: A lower cross-sectional spread of returns will increase the benefits from 
implementing active extension portfolios. 
 
If managers are required to increase their active weight sizes in environments of low 
cross-sectional dispersion, they will be more highly constrained by the long-only 
requirement. Accordingly, they will benefit more from introducing short positions into 
their portfolios. A higher level of short selling will allow managers to more efficiently 
distribute their higher active weights over both long and short positions in the portfolio 
to target a higher excess return for the same level of risk. 
 
5.7 Market conditions 
 
Holding all other factors equal, there is no theoretical reason to believe that active 
extension portfolios will perform better or worse in rising or falling markets. By 
definition, active extension portfolios have a constant 100% net market exposure and 
will have a beta approximating one if well diversified, and thus on average will perform 
in line with the broader market. Bear market conditions, defined as periods where 
market returns are below their long-term average, may be associated with changes in 
related exogenous factors such as market volatility, cross-sectional spread of returns or 
higher transaction costs due to lower liquidity. Apart from the effects of these factors, 
when all other factors are held equal declines or increases in the broader market should 
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not be expected to have an impact on the ability of active extension strategies to 
outperform (or underperform) the broader market. This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H7: The level of outperformance or underperformance of active extension portfolios is 
equivalent across periods of positive or negative market returns. 
 
The type of stock selection model may also affect performance during different market 
conditions, as evidenced by the significant underperformance of quant-driven active 
extension strategies during the market downturn in August 2007 (Khandani and Lo, 
2007). However if this underperformance was a result of the type of stock selection 
model used, it does not necessarily suggest that active extension portfolios are 
predisposed towards underperformance in difficult market conditions. In terms of the 
Clarke, de Silva and Thorley (2002) framework, the decline in information ratio may be 
caused by a lower information coefficient (stock-selection skill) even though the 
transfer coefficient (portfolio construction efficiency) has not declined. Evidence from 
Montagu (2007) supports this by suggesting that active extension portfolios would have 
a higher mean and lower variance of outperformance over the August 2007 period. The 
stock selection model used in this analysis does not make assumptions about the type of 
stock selection model used and thus allows for an analysis of active extension strategies 
in different market conditions, without being clouded by any changes in the 
performance of the underlying stock selection model. 
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6. DATA AND METHOD 
 
To analyse the above hypotheses, hypothetical portfolios are constructed based on 
historical returns data from stocks listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). 
A Monte Carlo approach is taken in simulating multiple hypothetical portfolios with 
different levels of short-selling to provide a backtest of how active extension portfolios 
would have performed over the previous eight year period. To test these hypotheses, the 
effect of changes in factors such as forecasting skill, skew in predictive ability and 
trading costs are varied, and the subsequent changes in portfolio performance over 
various levels of short selling are analysed. The following sections explain the portfolio 
construction techniques for the Monte Carlo simulation. Portfolio construction is 
divided into its two components of formulating our beliefs about future returns and 
constructing an efficient portfolio that reflects these beliefs. The following sections 
detail the method used to simulate these two steps of portfolio creation: generating a 
vector of stock return forecasts and covariance matrix, followed by constructing 
efficient portfolios using a portfolio optimisation algorithm.  A sample of portfolios are 
generated using a Monte Carlo process based on an assumed information coefficient, 
target level of tracking error and maximum level of shorting. The performance of active 
extension portfolios is then measured using statistical tests of their information ratios 
and alphas. 
 
6.1 Data 
 
Data on historical stock returns and index weightings is obtained from IRESS.  The 
analysis encompasses all stocks in the S&P/ASX 200 index from May 2000 to July 
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2008, including stocks added or removed due to index rebalancing by S&P. The sample 
covariance matrix was constructed from five years of monthly returns prior to May 
2000. Where returns were not available during this period for the calculation of 
covariances, such as for stocks that listed after May 2000, the variance terms were set at 
the mean variance with covariances calculated based on the mean pairwise correlation. 
The S&P/ASX 200 index is chosen due to the liquidity of its constituents and the 
greater availability and lower cost of borrowing stock relative to less liquid securities 
outside the index. Total shareholder returns are used for the analysis to include the value 
of dividends, and accordingly portfolio performance is benchmarked against the 
S&P/ASX 200 Accumulation index. Monthly returns will be used for the purposes of 
rebalancing portfolios and calculating tracking error. The use of monthly returns is in 
line with similar analysis (see Qian, Hua and Sorensen, 2007 and Montagu, 2007).  
 
6.2 Stock selection 
 
The stock selection method is based on a quantitative forecasting procedure proposed 
by Grinold and Kahn (2000a) that is related to the authors’ earlier fundamental law of 
active management. In quantitative management, the performance of stock selection 
models is often gauged on the level of their information coefficient, which is the 
correlation of forecast returns with realised returns for all securities in the benchmark. 
An information coefficient of zero implies the model has no predictive ability as the 
forecast returns do not have any relationship with realised returns. An information 
coefficient above zero implies that the model has some predictive ability in forecasting 
future returns of securities. The relative level of the information coefficient provides a 
measure that can be used to judge the performance of the forecasting ability of a 
portfolio’s stock selection model. 
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In this study, the stock selection model used to generate forecast returns is based on the 
above concept of an information coefficient measuring the forecasting ability of a 
manager. Grinold and Kahn (2000a) provide a method for simulating a generic stock 
selection model, which has been adopted in a number of later papers (see Clarke, de 
Silva and Thorley, 2002; Ledoit and Wolf, 2003a; Qian, Hua and Sorensen, 2007b). To 
create each set of forecasted returns for the top 200 stocks, returns are drawn from a 
normal distribution with a set correlation with realised returns for that period. The 
correlation of forecast returns with realised returns is equal to the information 
coefficient, which allows for a specific ex-ante predictive ability of the stock selection 
model to be set for each portfolio. In essence, this involves creating forecasts by adding 
noise to realised returns to mimic an active manager with some skill in forecasting 
returns.  Using a stochastic process in this way allows the simulation to mimic a 
potential set of forecasts by a skilled active manager by producing forecast returns that 
are randomised for each portfolio, but with a level of predictive ability scaled by the 
level of the information coefficient. The relative sizes and cross-sectional variations of 
the forecasts produced by the adjustment procedure are also consistent with the cross-
sectional variations in security returns. Although this method uses realised returns as a 
basis for generating a random sample of predictive returns, the randomisation process 
mimics a set of look-ahead forecasts that a manager with a predetermined level of skill 
could produce for the same period. 
 
Using the method of Grinold and Kahn (2000a) of generating random forecasts with a 
specified information coefficient (correlation with realised performance) provides a 
number of benefits. Firstly, no subjective assumptions are required regarding what 
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factors should be used in the stock selection model, providing a greater degree of 
generalisation to different stock-selection methods. Unlike using a quantitative factor 
model, using the method of Grinold and Kahn’s does not require a subjective 
assumption of what factors should be included in the model, and so the results are more 
generaliseable to other stock selection methods. The realised performance of these 
portfolios will therefore not be influenced by exposure to any quantitative factor and 
less prone to data-snooping bias. With a large enough sample of simulations, this should 
average out the inherent randomness in the model. In addition, the degree of manager 
skill assumed in the simulation portfolios, as measured by the information coefficient, 
can be varied and the effect of this variation on the efficiency of active extension 
portfolios can be measured. Lastly, potentially unlimited sets of simulated forecast 
returns are able to be generated for analysis, whereas if a factor model is used only one 
set of forecast returns per period will be generated. This will enable the simulation to 
analyse a larger sample size of simulations to make more robust inferences about the 
effects of short selling levels. 
 
The main advantage of this method of stock selection stems from the fundamental law 
of active management. The fundamental law of active management provides a 
breakdown of portfolio performance into stock selection performance, portfolio 
construction efficiency and size of investment universe: 
 
IR = TC.IC.√N (6.1) 
 
An intuition of the above is that creating an investment portfolio can be broken down 
into two components of stock selection and portfolio construction. The first step, stock 
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selection, is the process by which the forecast performance for investable stocks is 
assessed. In terms of the above fundamental law of active management, the information 
coefficient represents the stock selection skill that a manager possesses. The second step 
is portfolio construction, which involves identifying portfolio weights that efficiently 
reflect the manager’s forecast risk-adjusted returns for each security. Using the 
fundamental law above, the transfer coefficient represents the efficiency of portfolio 
construction, with a TC of 1 signifying weightings exactly proportional to the forecast 
risk-adjusted returns. In practice, portfolio constraints such as the ubiquitous long-only 
constraint prevent managers from creating portfolios that exactly reflect their views, 
resulting in an adverse effect on the transfer coefficient and hence a downward effect on 
the portfolio’s information ratio.  
 
This dissertation is focused on measuring the change in transfer coefficient and 
subsequent change in information ratio as a result of introducing short selling into long-
only portfolios. Using Grinold and Kahn’s (2000) methodology allows for a specific 
expected information coefficient to be set for each portfolio. Accordingly, the effect of 
short selling levels on the transfer coefficient and information ratio levels can be 
measured without any variance in information coefficient affecting the results. This 
gives the method of Grinold and Kahn (2000a) an advantage over other methods such as 
Armfelt and Somos (2008) and Lo and Patel (2008), which use different factor models 
for their stock selection. Although usage of these stock selection methods is standard in 
academic literature and the quantitative investment world, their performance varies 
naturally over time. For example, Armfelt and Somos (2008) use a Fama-French model 
for stock selection, which is partially based on constructing portfolios that are long 
‘value’ stocks and short ‘growth’ stocks based on price-to-book values. Although value 
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stocks have historically outperformed growth stocks over the long term (see Fama and 
French, 1992), the performance of value against growth is cyclical and there may be 
some periods, notoriously the tech boom of the late 1990’s, where growth outperforms 
value. The performance of active extension portfolios using these models is then highly 
subject to how the underlying stock selection model has performed over these periods.  
 
For the purposes of this study, the aim is to isolate any differences in performance 
exclusively to the level of short selling employed without being affected by the stock 
selection model employed. The method proposed by Grinold and Kahn (2000a) allows 
us to set an expected information coefficient, with some natural variance in information 
coefficient over time. In any case, the effectiveness of active extension strategies is 
highly exposed to the performance of the underlying stock selection model, and 
consequently if a poor stock selection model is chosen it will affect the performance of 
active extension portfolios using that model. For this analysis, the model of Grinold and 
Kahn (2000a) makes it possible to isolate changes in performance to the level of short 
selling, while keeping the effects of stock selection constant.  
 
The first step in construction of each portfolio is to simulate a set of hypothetical 
forecasts by a stochastic process. Grinold and Kahn (2000a) provide a method to refine 
raw return forecasts into forecast active returns by adjusting for different levels of 
volatility and the accuracy of each forecast, as measured by the information coefficient: 
 
ERi = IC.σi.Zi        (6.2) 
 
In equation (6.2), ERi is the forecast level of excess returns, IC is the assumed 
information coefficient that represents the level of manager skill and σi represents the 
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estimated residual standard deviation for stock i. Zi represents the ‘score’ for each 
security, which is a function of the raw forecasted return, standardised to fit a (0,1) 
distribution by the following transformation: 
 
( )( )ti ti
ti
ti raw
rawEraw
Z
,
,,
, σ
−=                                                                                   (6.3) 
 
To transform the raw forecast return into forecast outperformance, equation (6.2) is 
applied to the raw scores generated from equation (6.3). Equation (6.2) transforms the 
raw score into an expected return by multiplying by the information coefficient and 
level of standard deviation. The intuition behind this is that the higher the quality of the 
information, the more confidence it is possible to have in our forecasted raw return. As 
an example, for a manager with no skill and a corresponding information coefficient of 
zero, raw forecasts contain no information and hence the refined forecast of active 
returns will always be zero. For larger information coefficients the forecast returns have 
a larger correlation with realised returns, and hence it is possible to have a higher 
confidence in each forecast. Information coefficient multiplied by score gives us a 
unitless measure of confidence in how much to expect a security to outperform or 
underperform. Multiplying by the standard deviation term converts the confidence level 
into a refined forecast of outperformance.  In effect, the raw forecast is scaled by the 
volatility of the stock and the skill of the forecaster to give an adjusted score that 
reflects how confident we are in the accuracy of our forecasts.  
 
An approach suggested by Qian, Hua and Sorensen (2007b) is to incorporate the effects 
of transaction costs into the stock selection model. Portfolio turnover comes from two 
sources: the need to rebalance portfolios back to target weights due to security price 
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movements, and changes in forecasts necessitating changes in portfolio weights. To 
implement this, the generated forecasts have an autocorrelation of 0.25 with forecasts 
from the previous period as suggested by Qian, Sorensen and Hua (2007) to simulate 
some stability in forecasts across different time periods. This reflects the intuitive notion 
that a manager’s positive or negative view on a stock will have some consistency over 
time. Turnover is therefore limited to realistic levels as using a new set of forecasts for 
each monthly period requires the portfolio to be completely rebalanced, incurring high 
trading costs.  
 
6.3 Variance-covariance matrix estimation 
 
The second input into the optimisation algorithm is an estimated variance-covariance 
matrix. While the forecast security returns provide the inputs for maximising portfolio 
performance, the estimate of the covariance structure of security returns provides the 
means for minimising risk. Estimating the covariance matrix accurately is essential to 
creating portfolios that achieve the highest risk-reward trade-off within the set tracking 
error target. 
 
Unfortunately, the portfolio weights obtained through a mean-variance optimiser are 
highly sensitive to changes in covariance terms. Assets with large abnormal covariances 
tend to cause abnormally large weightings in the portfolio optimisation process. If these 
large covariance estimates are the result of errors in measurement, the estimated 
portfolio weights will display signs of bias. The problem of sensitivity of portfolio 
weights to misestimation in the covariance matrix is well documented (Jobson and 
Korkie, 1980; Michaud, 1989). In addition to the effects of estimation errors, Green and 
Hollifield (1992) show that naturally occurring large covariance terms can lead to 
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extreme negative weights within portfolios. Jagannathan and Ma (2003) suggest that the 
short-sale constraint acts as a form of shrinkage that prevents extreme negative weights 
from occurring. If the sample covariance matrix is applied across a number of portfolios 
with increasing levels of short selling, this will have an implicit effect of increasing the 
tracking error as the level of short sales increases. A higher tracking error will result in 
lower information ratios for active extension strategies than for long-only portfolios, 
creating a downward bias in performance for active extension strategies. 
 
To provide a more accurate estimate and avoid any bias in risk-adjusted performance 
towards long-only portfolios, a method proposed by Ledoit and Wolf (2003b) is used 
whereby the sample variance-covariance matrix is transformed through a process called 
‘shrinkage’. In effect, shrinkage pulls the most extreme values in the sample covariance 
matrix towards central values, removing the presence of outliers that could cause havoc 
during the portfolio optimisation problem. Ledoit and Wolf (2003b) show that, using 
the same portfolio optimisation process, the use of shrinkage reduces tracking error and 
results in higher information ratios. In active management terms, this infers that 
applying shrinkage to the sample covariance matrix increases the transfer coefficient.  
 
The shrinkage process put forward by Ledoit and Wolf (2003b) uses the following 
form: 
 
 SF )1(. δδ −+=Σ         (6.4) 
 
As in the above notation, Σ represents the shrinkage covariance estimator used for 
portfolio estimation, and is created by a weighted average of the sample covariance 
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matrix, S, and a structured estimator denoted F. The sample covariance matrix is 
determined by the sample covariance of five years of preceding monthly returns. The 
structured estimator provides a target covariance structure that the sample covariance 
matrix is ‘pulled’ towards. Ledoit and Wolf (2003a) suggest a structured estimator 
based on the single-factor estimator of Sharpe (1963). A later paper by Ledoit and Wolf 
(2003b) instead suggest a simpler structured estimator consisting of the diagonal 
variances from the sample covariance matrix, with all the off-diagonal covariance terms 
calculated from the average pairwise correlation from the sample covariance matrix. 
This method provides easier implementation due to its mathematical simplicity. 
Although a covariance matrix based on average pairwise correlations provides a naïve 
estimate, Ledoit and Wolf (2003b) suggest it is appropriate when looking at assets from 
a single asset class (equities) and empirically show that it gives similar results to the 
method based on Sharpe (1963).  
  
The variable δ is known as the shrinkage constant. The shrinkage constant determines 
what proportion of the final covariance matrix is determined by the structured 
component or the sample covariance matrix. The most optimal shrinkage constant to use 
is the value that minimises the difference between the shrinkage covariance estimator 
and the true covariance matrix. Fortunately, Ledoit and Wolf (2003b) provide a method 
by which it is possible to estimate the shrinkage constant based on an optimisation that 
minimises the squared difference between the shrinkage covariance estimator and true 
covariance estimator.  
 
Another possible method of correlation matrix estimation that is used by institutions is 
that provided by the Barra portfolio analysis system. Although the estimates provided 
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by Barra are widely used and highly regarded, the proprietary methodology used for 
estimating covariances is not disclosed. The model of Ledoit and Wolf (2003a, 2003b) 
is chosen for this dissertation as it provides a more transparent model that is intuitive 
and easily computed. 
 
6.4 Portfolio construction 
 
Portfolios are constructed from each vector of forecast active returns and a variance-
covariance matrix from five years of historical returns that uses a shrinkage adjustment 
to reduce measurement error. Given that the optimisation problem includes range 
constraints, it is not possible to use an analytical method such as the well-known closed-
form solution provided by Markowitz (1953). A numerical optimisation method is 
needed in order to maximise the objective function while imposing a number of range 
constraints. The most appropriate optimisation method to use is a quadratic optimisation 
process. A quadratic optimisation algorithm is used to maximise forecast portfolio 
returns, subject to limits on tracking error and short selling. As applying a numerical 
quadratic method to a large number of stocks can be time consuming, a more efficient 
approach suggested by Qian, Hua and Sorensen (2007a) is to use an algorithm based on 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions for optimisation with inequality constraints. The objective 
function is to maximise portfolio outperformance subject to a limit on tracking error. 
Additional constraints imposed to create portfolios that fit the active extension structure, 
that is to ensure that portfolios have 100% net exposure and a limit on the level of short 
selling (for example 30% for a 130/30 fund).  
 
The objective function for each optimisation is to maximise the information ratio after 
transaction costs, subject to a number of constraints. A budget constraint of full 
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investment is placed on the portfolio, with additional limits placed on the target level of 
short selling employed. Risk is controlled by a limit on tracking error, consistent with 
the construction of optimal portfolios in Qian, Hua and Sorensen (2007a). A summary 
of portfolio constraints is outlined in Table 6.2. Consistent with Clarke, de Silva and 
Thorley (2002), we do not incorporate additional size of position or factor exposure 
constraints. 
 
A practical issue encountered is that the universe of selectable stocks, the constituents of 
the S&P/ASX 200, varies over time as stocks are added to or removed from the index.  
Over time, stocks will naturally enter and exit the index for a number of reasons 
including takeovers, listings, delistings, changes in liquidity, changes in free float or 
increases/decreases in market value. In total, there have been a total of 376 unique 
stocks in the S&P/ASX 200 over the eight year period considered in this thesis. To 
account for this, the stock selection is restricted to only those stocks included in the 
index on the rebalancing date. If a stock is added to the index, it becomes available for 
investment. If a stock is removed from the index, any outstanding position long position 
is sold, or any short position in the stock is bought back. To incorporate this into the 
model, a restriction is placed on the optimiser that portfolio weights are set to zero if the 
particular stock is not a constituent of the index as of the balance date.  
 
There may be other constraints that in practice are placed on portfolios, including limits 
on individual active positions, sector bias, size bias or bias towards value or growth 
stocks. These constraints are not considered for the optimisation process. Introducing 
these constraints would require an arbitrary choice of what limits to set and would lower 
the transfer coefficient by restraining the optimisation process from fully implementing 
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all available information into the portfolio structure. Imposing a tracking error 
constraint should present a sufficient risk control for the portfolio without resorting to 
limits on individual positions or limits to factor exposure, such as value-growth 
neutrality or size-neutrality. This is consistent with Clarke, de Silva and Thorley (2002), 
who find that additional constraints on position limits or factor exposure are suboptimal 
as their effect reduces the transfer coefficient. 
 
Table 6.2: Portfolio constraints 
Name Constraint Description 
Budget constraint 
1, =∑
a
apw  
To maintain consistency 
with the structure of active 
extension portfolios, the 
portfolio is fully invested 
at all times. 
Short-selling 
(gross exposure) 
ϕ21, +≤∑
a
apw  
Short selling is limited to 
being less or equal to a 
target level of short selling 
by restricting gross 
exposure; eg for 130/30, 
phi is equal to 30%, 
restricting gross exposure 
to 160% 
Tracking error baaiapaia b
ap wwww ,,,,, ))(( σ−−∑∑  
       ≤ target level 
Forecast tracking error is 
limited to a maximum 
target set for the portfolio. 
Investable 
(inclusion in 
the index) 
0)1(, =− aap Iw   ∀ a 
Portfolio weights are 
restricted to zero if the 
stock is not in the 
S&P/ASX 200 for that 
month. Ia is equal to one if 
the stock is included in the 
index or zero otherwise. 
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Costs are also factored into the model to reflect their impact on portfolio performance. 
An approach suggested by Qian, Sorensen and Hua (2007) is to incorporate transaction 
costs and stock borrowing costs at the portfolio construction stage. The transaction 
component of the cost function is determined by applying a cost model incorporating 
commission and spread costs to the change in portfolio weightings. The short position 
component of the cost model is determined by proportion of the portfolio short sold, 
multiplied by the assumed cost of borrowing stock. Including the impact of costs into 
the portfolio construction model allows the portfolio to be optimised net of any costs 
involved in shorting stocks or rebalancing the portfolio. Repeating this process for each 
generated vector of forecasts is undertaken to provide a set of portfolios for analysis 
over different assumptions of manager skill, risk tolerance, trading costs and market 
conditions.  
 
The inclusion of a cost model in the portfolio construction model is important to give a 
fair comparison of the performance of active extension funds against long-only 
portfolios, as they incur a larger implementation cost. The cost function included in the 
model incorporates transaction costs and costs of borrowing stock. Consistent with 
Montagu (2007) and anecdotal evidence from market participants, the base case annual 
stock borrow cost is assumed to be 50bps, which is around 4.2bps on a monthly basis. 
The transaction cost function used for this study takes the following form: 
 
trans. cost = commission +                               + 
Daily
Trade
V
V
250
σ  (6.5) 
 
This cost function is provided by Grinold and Kahn (2000a) and incorporates both the 
explicit cost of commissions and market impact costs. The model is based on an 
         price 
bid / ask spread 
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inventory model that estimates the average time taken to clear the inventory of a 
liquidity supplier taking the opposite position in a trade. The model assumes that a 
return is required to liquidity suppliers in the form of market impact costs to 
compensate for the immediacy of trading. A portfolio size of $100m is assumed for the 
purposes of calculating daily volume traded. 
 
This cost function may overstate the cost of trading in three ways. Firstly, it is based on 
an inventory model where trading is conducted using market orders against existing 
limit orders or a market maker. In reality, some of the trading may take place by placing 
limit orders and thus incur a lower cost. Additionally, it assumes that trading takes place 
in one trading day, however large orders may be broken up over multiple days. The 
model also assumes that all trades are conducted on market, when in practice large 
portions of the trade may be able to be conducted off-market without incurring a market 
impact cost. As a result the model may overstate transaction costs, however considering 
that one aim of this study is to show that active extension portfolios outperform long-
only funds, it is preferable to overstate rather than understate transaction costs. 
 
Portfolios are rebalanced monthly, with the transaction cost function applied based on 
the rebalancing required to meet the new target weights. This study begins with an 
analysis of the performance of active extension portfolios, assuming the base case costs, 
information coefficient and tracking error target. The assumptions are then varied, with 
the sensitivity to active extension portfolio performance measured. Sensitivity to 
variations in skill levels, risk constraints and costs are measured by running a series of 
optimisations with modifications made to the assumptions. Variation with respect to 
market conditions, cross-sectional dispersion and volatility are measured by performing 
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a regression analysis on the sensitivity of performance of the active extension portfolios 
to these factors. 
 
Table 6.3: Summary of model base-case assumptions 
 
Name Assumption Based on 
Information coefficient 0.1 Montagu (2007): 0.09 
Kroll (2005): 0.05-0.15 
Tracking error limit 4% Montagu (2007): 4% 
Liodakis (2007): 1-5% 
Kroll (2005): 4% 
Martielli (2005): 5% 
Commission costs 0.4% Anecdotal: 0.4% 
Stock borrow costs 0.5% Montagu (2007): 0.5%  
White (2007): 0.65% 
Anecdotal: 0.5% 
Funding spread 0.5% White (2007): 0.5-0.7% 
 
 
6.5 Performance measurement 
 
The main performance measure used to measure portfolio performance is risk-adjusted 
performance, measured by the information ratio of the portfolio. Information ratios are 
defined as excess return over the benchmark, divided by tracking error: 
 
 
[ ]( )bp bp RR
RRE
IR −
−= σ          (6.5) 
 
Qian, Hua and Sorensen (2007a) recommend the use of information ratios when 
comparing long-only managers to active extension managers. For the purposes of this 
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study, it allows for a comparison among portfolios with different levels of shorting 
against the performance of the benchmark index. Information ratios are also an 
appropriate measure of performance across portfolios with different tracking errors as 
their calculation adjusts for different targeted tracking errors. The statistical significance 
of portfolio outperformance can be analysed using the following t-statistic: 
 
 
[ ]( ) 11 −=− −−= TIRRR TRREt bp bpa σ       (6.6)
  
Since the realised information coefficient can be measured, the Clarke, de Silva and 
Thorley (2002) modified fundamental theory of active management can be used to back 
out the realised transfer coefficient from performance: 
 
  
nIC
IRTC
.
=          (6.7) 
 
The above metrics provide a means by which portfolio performance can be analysed 
over different levels of short selling.  
 
Although information ratios are commonly used through industry and other active 
extension literature, one potential drawback is that they do not take into account what 
the net exposure to market risk is. For example, if a portfolio has a beta greater than 
one, the numerator term of portfolio return less portfolio return will be above zero over 
the long-term. This is not expected to be a significant issue, as the constructed portfolios 
are expected to be well diversified and as such will have betas tending towards one. For 
completeness, the results using information ratios are checked for robustness by 
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adjusting for any differences in betas across portfolios. To achieve this, average 
measures of alpha are calculated to measure outperformance on a risk-adjusted basis, 
where risk is measured by beta.  
 
In this context, alpha refers to the excess returns over those predicted by the CAPM 
equation, as defined by Jensen (1968). Jensen’s alpha provides an appropriate measure 
of performance as the fund remains fully invested with the same risk characteristics 
relative to the benchmark index for the full period. Alpha and beta for the portfolio are 
calculated by ordinary least squares on a modified CAPM: 
 
 εβα +−+=− )( fmfp RRRR  (6.8) 
 
This gives an ex-post measurement of risk-adjusted portfolio outperformance. Portfolio 
total returns are used, with market returns given by the returns on the S&P/ASX 200 
Accumulation index and the risk-free rate given by the 10-year Australian government 
bond yield. Alpha that is positive at a statistically significant level can be interpreted as 
outperformance of the index on a risk-adjusted basis. Paired t-tests are also run on 
alphas for the long-only portfolio against active extension portfolios based on the same 
set of forecast returns. 
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Figure 6.1: Portfolio creation flow diagram 
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7. RESULTS 
The following chapter provides a summary of the performance of the simulated active 
extension portfolios relative to long-only portfolios and the benchmark returns.  
Performance figures are presented as raw returns, excess returns, information ratios and 
Jensen’s alphas, with tests for statistical significance performed on the latter two. The 
sensitivity of performance to changes in the endogenous and exogenous factors outlined 
in the hypotheses is measured, including the effect of different skill levels, costs, 
volatility, cross-sectional dispersion and market conditions.  
 
7.1 Performance overview 
 
Using the base case assumptions 100 simulated sets of forecasts were created, from 
which portfolios were constructed at 11 different levels of short selling for a total of 
1,100 portfolios, rebalanced monthly. Table 7.1 gives an overview of the performance 
of the simulated active extension strategies. Over the sample period of May 2000 to July 
2008, the active extension portfolios outperformed the equivalent long-only and 
benchmark index returns by a statistically significant margin.  The average compound 
annual growth rate (CAGR) for 130/30 portfolios was 15.2%, compared with 13.3% for 
long-only funds utilising the same forecasts. The CAGR for the benchmark S&P/ASX 
200 Accumulation index was 10.1%. The performance of active extension portfolios 
increased with the level of short selling, with 150/50 funds having the highest CAGR of 
16.1% compared to the returns for 110/10 of 14.2%. The portfolios with higher levels of 
short selling had higher information ratios and transfer coefficients, showing that 
relaxation of the long-only constraint leads to the construction of more efficient 
portfolios. Using the method of Jensen (1968) to measure outperformance after 
adjusting for systematic risk, the average portfolio alpha is found to be statistically 
greater than zero while beta is statistically no different to one. 
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Table 7.1: Average performance for long-only and active extension funds, using base-case simulation assumptions 
This table presents the mean annualised performance for the simulated portfolios over different levels of short selling. Mean excess return, tracking 
error and information ratio are presented for each set of portfolios. Alpha and beta figures for the median portfolio in terms of performance are also 
presented. Figures are provided before (gross) and after (net) the involved transaction costs and stock borrow costs. Significance tests for information 
ratios and Jensen’s alphas are run under the null hypothesis that risk-adjusted outperformance is not greater than zero by a statistically significant level. 
The significance test for beta identifies whether beta is greater or lower than one by a statistically significant margin. Statistical significance at the 5% 
and 1% level is represented by * and ** respectively.  
 100/0 105/5 110/10 115/15 120/20 125/25 130/30 135/35 140/40 145/45 150/50 
            
Gross ER 3.63% 4.16% 4.52% 4.74% 4.97% 5.32% 5.61% 6.05% 6.29% 6.42% 6.45% 
Gross TE 4.02% 4.04% 4.09% 4.08% 4.14% 4.29% 4.44% 4.60% 4.64% 4.69% 4.72% 
Gross IR 0.90 1.03 1.10 1.16 1.20 1.24 1.26 1.32 1.36 1.37 1.37 
             
Turnover 39% 42% 44% 45% 46% 49% 50% 52% 55% 56% 58% 
Trading costs 0.28% 0.29% 0.31% 0.32% 0.33% 0.34% 0.35% 0.37% 0.38% 0.40% 0.41% 
Borrow and 
funding costs 0.00% 0.05% 0.10% 0.15% 0.20% 0.25% 0.30% 0.35% 0.40% 0.45% 0.50% 
Total costs 0.28% 0.34% 0.41% 0.47% 0.53% 0.59% 0.65% 0.72% 0.78% 0.85% 0.91% 
             
Net ER 3.35% 3.83% 4.11% 4.27% 4.45% 4.73% 4.96% 5.33% 5.51% 5.57% 5.54% 
Net IR 0.83 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.07 1.10 1.12 1.16 1.19 1.19 1.17 
IR t-stat 2.21 2.51* 2.66* 2.77* 2.84* 2.92* 2.96* 3.07* 3.14* 3.14* 3.11* 
TC 0.59 0.67 0.71 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.79 0.82 0.84 0.84 0.83 
            
Alpha 0.0024* 0.0028** 0.0077** 0.0078** 0.0078** 0.0082** 0.0083** 0.0085** 0.0088** 0.0088** 0.0090** 
Beta 1.027 1.014 0.985 0.993 1.023 0.995 1.026 1.032 0.986 1.005 0.967 
77 
Table 7.1 shows an increase in the information ratio as the level of short selling is 
increased, with active extension portfolios utilising higher levels of short selling 
returning a higher risk-adjusted return. Information ratios are presented both on a pre-
costs and post-costs basis. After transaction, stock borrow and funding costs, active 
extension portfolios are still able to outperform equivalent long-only portfolios despite 
costs reaching as high as an average 0.91% for 150/50 portfolios. Applying a t-test to 
the realised information ratios shows that the outperformance for the sampled active 
extension portfolios at 105/5 and above is significant at a 5% level. Using the notation 
of Clarke, de Silva and Thorley (2002)15, the transfer coefficients are able to be 
calculated from the information coefficient, breadth and realised information ratio. The 
average transfer coefficient for the long-only portfolios is 0.59, implying that 41% of 
the theoretical unconstrained information ratio is lost to implementation costs and the 
effects of constraints. Relaxing the long-only constraints leads to an increase in average 
transfer coefficient, with the 140/40 and 145/45 portfolios returning the highest average 
transfer coefficients of 0.84. 
 
Although the ex-ante tracking error target was set to 4%, the ex-post tracking error often 
exceeds this target by an amount that increases at higher levels of short selling. Qian, 
Hua and Sorensen (2007a) identify that a variation in IC over time, representing 
strategy risk, causes realised tracking error to increase above its target level. Although 
realised tracking error increases as the level of short selling is increased, on a risk-
adjusted basis the information ratio is still higher for larger levels of short positions. 
 
An analysis of portfolio performance is also performed using Jensen’s alpha as a 
measure of benchmark outperformance after adjusting for systematic risk exposure. The 
realised alpha and beta for the portfolio with median performance is shown in table 7.1, 
                                                 
15 For additional detail see section 4.2. 
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with statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level denoted by * and ** respectively. 
The statistical test performed on portfolio alphas tests whether they are greater than zero 
by a statistically significant amount. The test performed for the portfolio betas is that 
they are greater than or less than one by a statistically significant amount. The alphas for 
all active extension portfolios were greater than zero at a 1% level of significance, while 
none of the betas were significantly different to one at the 5% level. This indicates that, 
after adjusting for exposure to systematic risk, the active extension portfolios 
outperformed the benchmark index, with higher levels of short selling corresponding to 
higher levels of outperformance. Beta was found to statistically be no different to one, 
which confirms hypothesis seven that active extension portfolios have equal 
performance whether the overall market has positive or negative returns. 
 
An additional test performed tests alphas for the active extension portfolios against 
equivalent long-only portfolios. A regression is run on the equation given in equation 
6.8 to calculate the alphas for each portfolio. The alphas for portfolios at each level of 
short selling are tested against the alphas for long-only portfolios. A paired t-test is used 
to test that the mean difference between alphas in the long-only and active extension 
portfolios is greater than zero at a statistically significant level. Active extension and 
long-only portfolios created using the same set of forecasts are paired, such that each 
pair in the test consists of two portfolios created using the same set of inputs with the 
only difference being the level of short selling. Table 7.2 presents the results of the 
paired t-test. All active extension portfolios exhibited higher alphas than the equivalent 
long-only portfolio. The mean level of alpha for portfolios with a 5% short selling level 
exceed that of the long-only portfolios with a 10% level of statistical significance, while 
the active extension portfolios with a level of short selling 10% or above outperformed 
the long-only portfolios at the 1% level of significance. 
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Table 7.2: Paired t-test for active extension portfolio alphas  
This table shows the results of a paired t-test run between the realised alphas for each pair 
of long-only and active extension portfolios constructed using the same set of forecasts. 
T-statistics are presented with corresponding p-values based on a sample size of 100. 
 105/5 110/10 115/15 120/20 125/25 130/30 135/35 140/40 145/45 150/50
Mean 
alpha 
0.0026 0.0076 0.0080 0.0081 0.0083 0.0084 0.0085 0.0088 0.0089 0.0092
t-value 1.60 16.35 17.01 16.76 16.84 18.42 18.65 16.92 20.12 20.27 
p-value 0.055 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
Figure 7.1 shows the average information ratio over different levels of short selling, 
both before and after costs, and in comparison to the maximum possible information 
ratio achievable with no constraints or costs (i.e. a transfer coefficient of 1). The 
greatest jump in performance occurs at the initial relaxation of the short-selling 
constraint, with the marginal increase in performance decreasing as the level of short 
selling increases. As the level of short selling is increased, the increased cost drag 
widens the difference between before costs and after costs measures of information 
ratio. Despite this, there is still a tangible benefit at a 4% tracking error in increasing the 
level of short sales past the 130/30 level after accounting for the increase in costs.  
 
Figure 7.1: Average information ratios across short selling levels 
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Figure 7.2 shows the average performance over the sample period of long-only, 130/30 
and 150/50 strategies against the benchmark S&P/ASX 200 Accumulation index. Each 
portfolio is rebased to 100 as of the start date. Both long-only and active extension 
portfolios outperform the benchmark index due to a relatively high assumed information 
coefficient of 0.1. The active extension portfolios benefit from a relaxation in the long-
only constraint and are able to consistently outperform both the long-only portfolios and 
benchmark index over the sample period. 
 
Figure 7.2: Cumulative performance of long-only and active extension portfolios 
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7.2 Variation in skill levels 
 
Hypothesis one considers the effect of fund manager skill on the performance of active 
extension strategies. Intuitively, a manager with no skill will have no benefit from 
introducing short-selling into their portfolios, as the net effect will be an increase in 
financing, stock borrow and trading costs. For larger levels of skill, the manager will be 
able to make more accurate forecasts and will thus be able to benefit more from the 
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introduction of short sale positions. To simulate the effect of different skill levels, 
portfolios are simulated with information coefficients of 0.05, 0.1 and 0.15 to represent 
managers with low skill, good skill and exceptional levels of skill.  
 
Table 7.3 provides a summary of the performance for these portfolios. The performance 
across all short selling levels is highest for the portfolio with the highest information 
coefficient, reflecting the higher information content in the generated forecasts. 
However, there is a greater increase in performance for the ‘exceptional skill’ portfolio 
in relaxing the long-only constraint than for the ‘low skill’ portfolio. Figure 7.3 shows 
this difference graphically, with the information coefficient of the ‘exceptional skill’ 
portfolios increasing 65% due to moving from 100/0 to 150/50, while the information 
coefficient of the ‘low skill’ portfolio decreases 2% for the same change in short selling. 
The CAGR for the ‘exceptional skill’ portfolios increased by from 14.4% for the long-
only portfolio to 20.0% for the 150/50 portfolio (+5.6%). By comparison, the ‘good 
skill’ portfolios increased from 13.3% to 16.1% (+2.8%), while the ‘low skill’ portfolios 
decreased from 14.8% to 14.7% (-0.1%). This confirms hypothesis one, that managers 
with higher skill levels have a greater increase in performance from relaxing the long-
only constraint. 
 
Figure 7.3: Average information ratios across skill levels 
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Table 7.3: Active extension fund performance across different skill levels 
This table presents the mean annualised performance for the simulated portfolios at different levels of short selling and different skill levels. Mean 
excess returns, tracking errors, information ratios and transfer coefficients are presented for each portfolio, along with computed alphas for the median-
performing portfolio. Figures are provided on an after costs basis. Significance tests for information ratios and Jensen’s alphas are run under the null 
hypothesis that risk-adjusted outperformance is not greater than zero by a statistically significant level. Statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels 
are represented by * and ** respectively. 
 100/0 105/5 110/10 115/15 120/20 125/25 130/30 135/35 140/40 145/45 150/50 
Low skill (IC = 0.05)           
ER 2.03% 2.18% 2.25% 2.23% 2.31% 2.25% 2.24% 2.33% 2.26% 2.17% 2.26% 
TE 3.99% 4.01% 4.03% 4.05% 4.09% 4.19% 4.22% 4.28% 4.31% 4.39% 4.51% 
IR 0.51 0.54 0.56 0.55 0.57 0.54 0.53 0.54 0.52 0.49 0.50 
TC 0.72 0.77 0.79 0.78 0.80 0.76 0.75 0.77 0.74 0.70 0.71 
Alpha 0.0014 0.0018 0.0030* 0.0041** 0.0050** 0.0045** 0.0048** 0.0050** 0.0042** 0.0044** 0.0047** 
            
Good skill (IC = 0.10)           
ER 3.35% 3.83% 4.11% 4.27% 4.45% 4.73% 4.96% 5.33% 5.51% 5.57% 5.54% 
TE 4.02% 4.04% 4.09% 4.08% 4.14% 4.29% 4.44% 4.60% 4.64% 4.69% 4.72% 
IR 0.83 0.95* 1.00* 1.05* 1.07* 1.10* 1.12* 1.16* 1.19* 1.19* 1.17* 
TC 0.59 0.67 0.71 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.79 0.82 0.84 0.84 0.83 
Alpha 0.0024* 0.0028** 0.0077** 0.0078** 0.0078** 0.0082** 0.0083** 0.0085** 0.0088** 0.0088** 0.0090** 
            
Exceptional skill (IC = 0.15)          
ER 4.45% 5.11% 5.32% 5.93% 6.34% 6.77% 7.33% 8.01% 8.61% 8.93% 9.40% 
TE 4.03% 4.08% 4.11% 4.17% 4.21% 4.31% 4.49% 4.72% 4.89% 5.01% 5.15% 
IR 1.10* 1.25* 1.29* 1.42** 1.51** 1.57** 1.63** 1.70** 1.76** 1.78** 1.82** 
TC 0.52 0.59 0.61 0.67 0.71 0.74 0.77 0.80 0.83 0.84 0.86 
Alpha 0.0032** 0.0088** 0.0089** 0.0090** 0.0095** 0.0103** 0.0123** 0.0128** 0.0137** 0.0141** 0.0153** 
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Hypothesis two considers the effect on performance of a manager who has a skew in 
performance towards picking long-side or short-side stocks. A manager with skill in 
managing long-only portfolios may have more skill in identifying securities for the long 
component of the portfolio than for the short side due to their experience in solely 
picking long-only stocks. Using the 100 simulated forecasts and associated portfolios 
created in section 7.1 that assumed a tracking error of 4% and information coefficient of 
0.1, an additional two sets of portfolios were created. One set of portfolios simulates a 
manager with a bias in skill towards identifying outperforming stocks for long positions 
by giving the manager a skill of 0.15 in selecting stocks that go on to outperform the 
index, and a skill of 0.05 at selecting underperforming stocks. Similarly, the portfolios 
that simulate a manager with a bias towards picking short-side positions has an 
information coefficient of 0.05 for stocks that outperform the index and 0.15 for stocks 
that underperform the index. Assuming that over the sample period the same number of 
stocks outperformed and underperformed the index, all three sets of portfolios have an 
average information coefficient of 0.1. 
 
Table 7.4 shows the results for all three sets of portfolios over the full eight-year period. 
When the long-only constraint was imposed, the portfolio based on long-biased skill 
outperformed the equal skill and short-biased skill portfolios. However, at 130/30 and 
above, the equal skill portfolio outperformed the portfolios with bias in skill. The 
portfolios constructed with long-biased and short-biased skill underperformed the equal 
skill portfolio at levels of short selling above 130/30. In addition, all active extension 
portfolios at shorting levels of 120/20 and above across the different skill classifications 
were able to outperform all the long-only portfolios. 
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Table 7.4: Performance for active extension funds with bias in stock-selection ability 
This table presents the mean annualised performance for the simulated portfolios, where stock selection skill is skewed towards picking potential 
outperformers or potential underperformers. Mean excess return, tracking error and information ratio are presented for each portfolio, along with 
alphas for the median-performing portfolio. Figures are provided after costs. Significance tests for information ratios and Jensen’s alphas are run under 
the null hypothesis that risk-adjusted outperformance is not greater than zero by a statistically significant level. Statistical significance at the 5% and 
1% level is represented by * and ** respectively. 
 100/0 105/5 110/10 115/15 120/20 125/25 130/30 135/35 140/40 145/45 150/50 
Equal skill           
ER 3.35% 3.83% 4.11% 4.27% 4.45% 4.73% 4.96% 5.33% 5.51% 5.57% 5.54% 
TE 4.02% 4.04% 4.09% 4.08% 4.14% 4.29% 4.44% 4.60% 4.64% 4.69% 4.72% 
IR 0.83 0.95* 1.00* 1.05* 1.07* 1.10* 1.12* 1.16* 1.19* 1.19* 1.17* 
TC 0.59 0.67 0.71 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.79 0.82 0.84 0.84 0.83 
Alpha 0.0024* 0.0028** 0.0077** 0.0078** 0.0078** 0.0082** 0.0083** 0.0085** 0.0088** 0.0088** 0.0090** 
            
Long-biased skill           
ER 3.94% 4.26% 4.60% 4.46% 4.39% 4.91% 4.86% 5.31% 5.41% 5.26% 5.42% 
TE 4.04% 4.02% 4.12% 4.15% 4.14% 4.51% 4.41% 4.69% 4.72% 4.71% 4.79% 
IR 0.98* 1.06* 1.12* 1.07* 1.06* 1.09* 1.10* 1.13* 1.15* 1.12* 1.13* 
TC 0.69 0.75 0.79 0.76 0.75 0.77 0.78 0.80 0.81 0.79 0.80 
Alpha 0.0035** 0.0079** 0.0088** 0.0086** 0.0081** 0.0073** 0.0075** 0.0082** 0.0079** 0.0095** 0.0083** 
            
Short-biased skill           
ER 2.17% 2.94% 3.51% 3.95% 4.40% 4.52% 4.63% 5.06% 5.25% 5.04% 5.45% 
TE 4.03% 4.08% 4.07% 4.17% 4.38% 4.44% 4.42% 4.65% 4.70% 4.69% 4.76% 
IR 0.54 0.72 0.86 0.95* 1.00* 1.02* 1.05* 1.09* 1.12* 1.07* 1.15* 
TC 0.38 0.51 0.61 0.67 0.71 0.72 0.74 0.77 0.79 0.76 0.81 
Alpha 0.0019* 0.0021* 0.003** 0.0055** 0.0070** 0.0069** 0.0085** 0.0087** 0.0089** 0.009** 0.0088** 
85 
Figure 7.4 shows how the skew in skill affects the information ratios of active extension 
strategies. With no short-selling (100/0), the portfolio with long-biased skill showed the 
greatest level of performance. The peak level of performance for the portfolios with 
long-biased skill was at a level of 110/10, with little discernable increase in performance 
above this level. This is consistent with Liodakis (2007), who proposes that there will 
be some limited benefit to introducing short selling despite little skill in picking 
potential underperformers. The portfolio with short-biased skill showed the lowest 
information ratio with the no short-selling constraint imposed, but had the greatest 
increase in performance from the relaxation of the long-only constraint. The equal skill 
portfolio had performance roughly in between the long-biased and short-biased skill 
portfolios for low levels of short selling. At a 120/20 level and above, the equal skill 
portfolio outperformed the long-biased and short-biased skilled portfolios. This is not 
consistent with hypothesis two, as the portfolios with long-biased skill and equal skill 
are able to outperform the portfolios with short-biased skill at all levels of short selling.  
 
Figure 7.4: Average information ratios across manager skill biases 
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7.3 Risk constraints 
 
Hypothesis three considers the effects of risk constraints on the performance of active 
extension strategies over an equivalent long-only strategy. A higher level of tracking 
error implies that larger active positions are taken in the portfolio, which increases the 
restrictiveness of the long-only constraint. As a result, portfolios with higher tracking 
error are likely to benefit more from introducing short selling than portfolios with lower 
tracking error. 100 sets of forecasts were simulated, with long-only portfolios and active 
extension portfolios constructed over 11 different levels of short selling at 5% intervals 
with five different levels of tracking error, creating a total sample of 5,500 portfolios 
that are rebalanced monthly. 
 
Table 7.5 shows the average information ratios and transfer coefficients for the sampled 
portfolios across different levels of tracking error. The largest excess returns were for 
the portfolios with higher tracking error and higher levels of short selling, as these 
portfolios allowed the largest active positions to be taken to reflect the forecast stock 
returns. The increase in average information ratio from long-only to 150/50 can be seen 
to be positively related to the level of tracking error in the portfolio. At a 2% level of 
tracking error, the average information ratio increases from 0.98 for the long-only 
portfolio to 1.20 for the 150/50 fund (+23%). At the 6% level of tracking error, the 
average information ratio increases from 0.3 to 1.12 (+273%). This result is consistent 
with hypothesis 7, which states that the performance increase from relaxing the long-
only constraint is highest for portfolios with greater levels of tracking error. Figure 7.5 
also shows the difference in transfer coefficients over portfolios with different target 
levels of tracking error. 
 
87 
Figure 7.5: Transfer coefficients for active extension portfolios 
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The highest information ratios and transfer coefficients were found to be for the 
portfolios with the lowest tracking error, although there was a comparatively smaller 
increase in performance for introducing short positions, and a negligible performance 
benefit in increasing the level of short selling past 30%. As the level of short selling is 
set as a maximum upper bound, for many portfolios with a short selling level above 
30% the portfolio optimiser chose to use a smaller level of short selling than the 
maximum in order to maximum returns within the relatively low tracking error. There 
would be little benefit in constraining these portfolios into an exact 50% shorting level, 
as this would be difficult to achieve within the 2% tracking error limit. As a result, there 
is little benefit to increasing short selling in these portfolios past the typical 30% level 
as imposing a high level of short selling is needlessly restrictive.  
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Table 7.5: Average performance for long-only and active extension funds with different tracking error targets 
This table shows the mean excess returns, tracking errors, information ratios and transfer coefficients for each level of tracking error for a given 
level of short selling. Risk-adjusted outperformance, as measured by the information ratio, is higher for portfolios with lower levels of tracking 
error and higher levels of short selling. Significance tests are performed on the information ratios, with * and ** denoting significance levels of 
10% and 5% respectively.   
 100/0 105/5 110/10 115/15 120/20 125/25 130/30 135/35 140/40 145/45 150/50 
            
2% target tracking error          
ER 1.96% 2.14% 2.24% 2.30% 2.46% 2.51% 2.65% 2.58% 2.65% 2.61% 2.63% 
TE 2.01% 2.02% 2.06% 2.06% 2.10% 2.11% 2.13% 2.15% 2.18% 2.20% 2.19% 
IR 0.98** 1.06** 1.09** 1.12** 1.17** 1.19** 1.24** 1.20** 1.22** 1.19** 1.20** 
TC 0.69 0.75 0.77 0.79 0.83 0.84 0.88 0.85 0.86 0.84 0.85 
            
3% target tracking error          
ER 2.64% 2.83% 3.22% 3.26% 3.35% 3.58% 3.76% 3.91% 3.95% 4.04% 4.20% 
TE 3.02% 3.03% 3.08% 3.07% 3.12% 3.20% 3.29% 3.38% 3.41% 3.45% 3.46% 
IR 0.88* 0.93** 1.05** 1.06** 1.07** 1.12** 1.15** 1.16** 1.16** 1.17** 1.22** 
TC 0.62 0.66 0.74 0.75 0.76 0.79 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.86 
            
4% target tracking error          
ER 3.35% 3.83% 4.11% 4.27% 4.45% 4.73% 4.96% 5.33% 5.51% 5.57% 5.54% 
TE 4.02% 4.04% 4.09% 4.08% 4.14% 4.29% 4.44% 4.60% 4.64% 4.69% 4.72% 
IR 0.83* 0.95** 1.00** 1.05** 1.07** 1.10** 1.12** 1.16** 1.19** 1.19** 1.17** 
TC 0.59 0.67 0.71 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.79 0.82 0.84 0.84 0.83 
            
5% target tracking error          
ER 2.41% 3.22% 4.13% 4.39% 4.66% 4.86% 5.21% 5.63% 5.83% 6.06% 6.30% 
TE 5.02% 5.06% 5.13% 5.09% 5.15% 5.29% 5.42% 5.60% 5.65% 5.72% 5.71% 
IR 0.48 0.64 0.81* 0.86* 0.91** 0.92** 0.96** 1.00** 1.03** 1.06** 1.10** 
TC 0.34 0.45 0.57 0.61 0.64 0.65 0.68 0.71 0.73 0.75 0.78 
            
6% target tracking error          
ER 1.79% 3.77% 4.45% 4.96% 5.40% 5.74% 6.28% 6.47% 7.03% 7.30% 7.85% 
TE 6.03% 6.07% 6.17% 6.15% 6.26% 6.44% 6.63% 6.83% 6.90% 6.98% 7.03% 
IR 0.30 0.62 0.72* 0.81* 0.86* 0.89* 0.95** 0.95** 1.02** 1.05** 1.12** 
TC 0.21 0.44 0.51 0.57 0.61 0.63 0.67 0.67 0.72 0.74 0.79 
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7.4 Costs 
Hypothesis four considers the impact of costs on the performance of active extension 
strategies. Active extension strategies face additional costs over long-only portfolios 
through increased turnover, the requirement to pay stock borrow costs on short positions 
and the financing costs required to pay for the additional long positions. To model the 
effect of costs, portfolios are simulated at a low, medium and high level of costs. The 
cost assumptions used are outlined in Table 7.6. 100 simulated portfolios are created for 
each cost assumption case at each level of short selling, yielding a total 3,300 sample 
portfolios that are rebalanced monthly over the sample period. The ‘base case’ cost 
assumptions are identical to those used for testing all other hypotheses. 
 
Table 7.6: Simulation cost assumptions 
 Low Medium (base case) High 
Commission costs 0.20% 0.40% 0.60% 
Stock borrow costs 0.25% 0.50% 0.75% 
Funding spread 0.25% 0.50% 0.75% 
 
 
Table 7.7 shows the average realised performance and costs for the sampled portfolios. 
As the portfolio construction process takes into account the effect of costs during the 
optimisation process, the portfolios have different weightings and therefore different 
levels of performance before costs. After costs, the portfolios with higher costs have a 
lower level of performance. The portfolios with the highest costs exhibited the largest 
drop-off in information coefficient as the level of short selling was increased. The 
highest information coefficient for the ‘high costs’ portfolios was 130/30, above which 
the information coefficient dropped due to the higher trading and borrow costs. The
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Table 7.7: Sensitivity of active extension performance to changes in trading, borrow and funding costs 
This table presents the mean annualised performance for the simulated portfolios over different levels of short selling over the three cost cases outlined 
in table 7.6. Mean excess returns, tracking errors, information ratios and transfer coefficients are presented for each set of portfolios. Performance 
figures are provided after the involved transaction costs and stock borrow costs. Significance tests for information ratios are run under the null 
hypothesis that risk-adjusted outperformance is not greater than zero by a statistically significant level. Statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level 
is represented by * and ** respectively.  
 100/0 105/5 110/10 115/15 120/20 125/25 130/30 135/35 140/40 145/45 150/50 
            
Low costs            
Turnover 47% 51% 53% 54% 56% 59% 61% 63% 66% 68% 74% 
Trading costs 0.27% 0.28% 0.30% 0.31% 0.32% 0.33% 0.34% 0.36% 0.36% 0.39% 0.42% 
Borrow & funding costs 0.00% 0.03% 0.05% 0.08% 0.10% 0.13% 0.15% 0.18% 0.20% 0.23% 0.25% 
Total costs 0.27% 0.31% 0.35% 0.38% 0.42% 0.45% 0.49% 0.53% 0.56% 0.61% 0.67% 
ER 3.40% 3.89% 4.16% 4.34% 4.75% 4.84% 5.22% 5.61% 5.54% 5.82% 5.90% 
TE 4.01% 4.05% 4.09% 4.09% 4.15% 4.28% 4.45% 4.61% 4.61% 4.73% 4.74% 
IR 0.85* 0.96** 1.02** 1.06** 1.15** 1.13** 1.17** 1.22** 1.20** 1.23** 1.24** 
TC 0.60 0.68 0.72 0.75 0.81 0.8 0.83 0.86 0.85 0.87 0.88 
            
Medium costs (base case)           
Turnover 39% 42% 44% 45% 46% 49% 50% 52% 55% 56% 58% 
Trading costs 0.28% 0.29% 0.31% 0.32% 0.33% 0.34% 0.35% 0.37% 0.38% 0.40% 0.41% 
Borrow & funding costs 0.00% 0.05% 0.10% 0.15% 0.20% 0.25% 0.30% 0.35% 0.40% 0.45% 0.50% 
Total costs 0.28% 0.34% 0.41% 0.47% 0.53% 0.59% 0.65% 0.72% 0.78% 0.85% 0.91% 
            
ER 3.35% 3.83% 4.11% 4.27% 4.45% 4.73% 4.96% 5.33% 5.51% 5.57% 5.54% 
TE 4.02% 4.04% 4.09% 4.08% 4.14% 4.29% 4.44% 4.60% 4.64% 4.69% 4.72% 
IR 0.83* 0.95** 1.00** 1.05** 1.07** 1.10** 1.12** 1.16** 1.19** 1.19** 1.17** 
TC 0.59 0.67 0.71 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.79 0.82 0.84 0.84 0.83 
            
High costs            
Turnover 35% 37% 39% 40% 43% 42% 46% 49% 51% 53% 57% 
Trading costs 0.28% 0.29% 0.31% 0.32% 0.33% 0.34% 0.35% 0.37% 0.38% 0.40% 0.41% 
Borrow & funding costs 0.00% 0.08% 0.15% 0.23% 0.30% 0.38% 0.45% 0.53% 0.60% 0.68% 0.75% 
Total costs 0.28% 0.36% 0.46% 0.54% 0.63% 0.72% 0.80% 0.89% 0.98% 1.07% 1.16% 
            
ER 3.24% 3.71% 3.99% 4.16% 4.39% 4.66% 4.86% 4.96% 5.05% 5.12% 4.97% 
TE 4.02% 4.04% 4.09% 4.09% 4.14% 4.28% 4.44% 4.62% 4.64% 4.70% 4.75% 
IR 0.81* 0.92* 0.98** 1.02** 1.06** 1.09** 1.10** 1.07** 1.09** 1.09** 1.05** 
TC 0.57 0.65 0.69 0.72 0.75 0.77 0.775 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.74 
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‘low costs’ portfolio suffers less of a drop-off in performance at higher levels of short 
selling as the cost drag from increased turnover and borrowing is lower. Figure 7.6 
graphically shows the information ratios for each set of cost assumptions over different 
levels of short selling. 
 
Figure 7.6: Average information ratios over different cost assumptions 
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
100/0 105/5 110/10 115/15 120/20 125/25 130/30 135/35 140/40 145/45 150/50
Low costs Medium costs (base case) High costs
 
 
The important implication from this is that increased costs lower the amount of short 
selling that should be used, as adding additional short positions beyond a certain point 
will be inefficient due to the higher costs involved. This implies that, all other factors 
being equal, higher costs necessitate targeting a lower level of short selling. These 
results are consistent with hypothesis four, which states that an increase in transaction 
costs and stock borrow costs lowers the performance of active extension strategies. 
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7.5 Volatility, cross-sectional spread and market conditions 
 
Hypotheses five, six and seven consider the effect of exogenous market factors on the 
performance of active extension portfolios. Hypothesis five proposes that the 
performance of active extension strategies will be greater in periods of higher market 
volatility due to diversification effects. Hypothesis six looks at the effect of cross-
sectional dispersion. As the long-only constraint presents a greater restriction on when 
stocks are more highly correlated, hypothesis six proposes that active extension 
portfolios perform better in comparison to long-only portfolios in periods where 
individual stocks are more highly correlated. Hypothesis seven considers the 
performance of active extension portfolios in periods where market returns are above or 
below average. These hypotheses are tested jointly by adding proxies for volatility and 
cross-sectional dispersion into the CAPM-based equation given in equation 6.8: 
 
ερβσββα +++−+=− MMfmfp RRRR 321 )(  (7.1) 
 
Equation 7.1 is an extension of Jensen’s model (1968) to measure the effect on 
performance of active extension portfolios of market-wide volatility and cross-sectional 
dispersion, after adjusting for market returns. Monthly returns from the 100 simulated 
130/30 portfolios in section 7.1 are used, for a total sample size of 9,900 observed 
monthly returns. The measure of cross-sectional dispersion used is the mean pairwise 
correlation of monthly returns. Volatility for the S&P/ASX 200 Accumulation index 
was measured on a historical 12-month basis. Table 7.8 shows the results of the above 
regression. 
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Table 7.8: Regression results 
This table presents the results of the regression outlined in section 7.5. Monthly excess 
returns over the risk-free rate (10-year bond yield) are regressed against market excess 
returns, market volatility and pairwise correlations.  
Variable Coefficients Standard Error T Statistic P-value 
Intercept 0.000 0.000 -1.449 0.147 
Market returns 1.015 0.002 432.230 0.000 
Market volatility -0.357 0.198 -1.802 0.071 
Pairwise correl. 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.996 
     
Regression Statistics       
R Square 0.950    
Adj.R Square 0.950    
Standard Error 0.008    
F-statistic 62665    
Observations 9900       
 
Table 7.8 displays the regression results which show the explanatory power of market 
volatility and cross-sectional dispersion on portfolio performance. The coefficient for 
market volatility was -0.357, suggesting that monthly outperformance decreases by        
-0.357% for every 1% increase in 12-month rolling market volatility. This is contrary to 
hypothesis five, which put forward that higher market volatility would lead to higher 
risk-adjusted portfolio performance.  The coefficient for pairwise correlation was close 
to zero with no statistical significance, implying that pairwise correlation has no effect 
on the performance of active extension portfolios.  
 
The observed coefficient for beta was 1.015, which is statistically greater than one with 
a p-value less than 1%. This would suggest that the active extension portfolios 
outperform the index when index returns are positive and underperform the index when 
index returns are negative.  However, the beta coefficient of 1.015 is only marginally 
greater than one, implying that the exposure to systematic risk is roughly in line with 
the benchmark index. This result is also confirmed by the regression testing shown in 
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Table 7.1, which found that the beta for the active extension portfolios was statistically 
no different to one. 
7.6 Summary of results 
 
Overall, the active extension portfolios simulated in this study outperformed both the 
equivalent long-only portfolios and the benchmark index, with higher levels of short 
selling corresponding to increased outperformance. An increase in stock selection skill 
led to a greater performance increase at the higher levels of short selling, reflecting that 
the active extension strategy allows for a more efficient implementation of information 
than a long-only portfolio. The active extension strategy was shown to work best when 
managers have an equal bias towards identifying potential outperformers or 
underperformers. The increase in performance from relaxing the long-only constraint 
was greatest for the portfolios with the highest tracking error, reflecting that portfolios 
with larger active positions are more likely to be restricted by the long-only constraint.  
Costs also had a large impact on performance, with higher cost levels having a 
relatively larger impact at greater levels of short selling due to the higher gross exposure 
of the portfolio. Cross-sectional spread and market direction had no discernable impact 
on the performance of active extension strategies, while volatility had the opposite 
effect to that which was hypothesised. Finally, there was no observable effect of 
whether active extension portfolios performed better in ‘bull’ or ‘bear’ markets, as beta 
for the portfolios could not be shown to be statistically different from one. 
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Table 7.9: Active extension hypotheses 
This table summarises the hypotheses outlined in chapter 5 and their subsequent results. 
Hypothesis Results
H1: Managers with higher skill levels have a greater 
increase in performance from relaxing the long-only 
constraint. 
Confirm
H2: Managers with a higher skew towards picking 
underperforming stocks can construct active extension 
portfolios with higher levels of performance. 
Reject
H3: Portfolios with higher tracking error limits have a 
greater performance increase from relaxing the long-only 
constraint. 
Confirm
H4: An increase in transaction costs and stock borrow 
costs will lower the performance of active extension 
strategies. 
Confirm
H5: Higher market volatility will increase the performance 
of active extension strategies. 
Reject
H6: A lower cross-sectional spread of returns will increase 
the benefits from implementing active extension portfolios. 
Cannot confirm
H7: The level of outperformance or underperformance of 
active extension portfolios is equivalent across periods of 
positive or negative market returns. 
Confirm
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8. CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation studies the performance of equity portfolios using active extension 
strategies. The primary difference in active extension funds over long-only funds is the 
relaxation of the long-only constraint. The main implication of this study is that active 
extension strategies are the optimal choice for investors who seek actively managed 
equity portfolios that are fully invested in the market. Active extension portfolios 
provide an effective blend of long-only funds and market-neutral hedge funds, allowing 
managers to pursue short-selling opportunities to potentially increase portfolio alpha 
while simultaneously retaining an exposure to overall market returns. This dissertation 
has found that active extension portfolios are able to outperform equivalent long-only 
portfolios and the benchmark index by a statistically significant margin. These results 
build on previous literature (Qian, Sorensen and Hua, 2007b; Clarke, de Silva and 
Thorley, 2008) by extending the analysis to encompass a different market and examine 
the effects of additional variables on performance. These results also have implications 
for institutional fund managers who are considering offering or investing in active 
extension strategies.  
 
The degree to which an active extension portfolio outperforms an equivalent long-only 
portfolio and the benchmark index is positively related to the level of manager skill and 
negatively related to the level of costs. Active extension strategies do not add additional 
information, but provide managers with the ability to more efficiently use their existing 
information. Costs have a significant effect on portfolio performance as they tend to 
increase as the level of short selling in the portfolio is increased. Whether active 
extension portfolios are able to outperform long-only portfolios depends on whether the 
forecasting ability of the manager is sufficient to outperform the cost drag. Provided 
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that the manager has some reasonable degree of forecasting ability, active extension 
portfolios outperform equivalent portfolios with the long-only constraint in place. If the 
manager has little or no skill in stock picking, the net effect of using an active extension 
strategy will be a decrease in performance from the increased cost drag.   
 
The performance of active extension strategies is closely related to the targeted level of 
risk. Funds with lower risk targets benefit little from introducing short-selling, while for 
funds with higher risk targets active extension portfolios generally present greater 
risk/return opportunities than funds concentrated in a small number of long positions. 
External market conditions such as volatility, pairwise correlation between individual 
stocks and market direction are found to have a limited impact on active extension 
performance.  
 
The results of this study have implications for investors seeking to identify whether 
allocating assets to an active extension fund is appropriate and if so, what characteristics 
to consider when choosing a fund. Many active extension strategies have only been 
created in the past five to ten years, which creates difficulties in assessing what future 
performance of the fund might be. When choosing a fund the manager of the active 
extension fund must be able to generate outperformance, as if the manager has no skill 
in adding value the net effect of moving to a short-extension strategy will be negative 
due to the increased cost burden. It is also preferable for the manager to have experience 
with shorting. Where the manager is using an active extension strategy, the level of 
shorting used should also reflect the manager’s skill level, risk target, costs and market 
conditions.  
 
Although this thesis has aimed to be comprehensive in its analysis of the factors driving 
active extension fund performance, there are still significant avenues for future research. 
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Testing over a longer period would allow for a more robust analysis of the performance 
of active extension funds. Applying this analysis to different regions would also confirm 
whether the results of this thesis apply across different equity markets. The ultimate test 
of the benefits of active extension funds will be an analysis of their historical 
performance. At present, given the recent genesis of these strategies there is little in the 
way of historical performance to compare against long-only funds and index 
benchmarks. However once longer periods of data are available it will be possible to 
give a more concrete view on the performance of active extension funds. 
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